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Junk Science at Sentencing
Maneka Sinha*
ABSTRACT
Junk science used in criminal trials has contributed to hundreds of
wrongful convictions. But the problem is much worse than that. Junk science
does not only harm criminal defendants who go to trial, but also the over-
whelming majority of defendants—over ninety-five percent—who plead
guilty, skip trial, and proceed straight to sentencing.
Scientific, technical, and other specialized evidence (“STS evidence”) is
used regularly, and with increasing frequency, at sentencing. Despite this, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702 and its state equivalents—which help filter unrelia-
ble STS evidence at trials—do not apply at the critical sentencing stage. In fact,
at sentencing, no meaningful admissibility standard guards against junk sci-
ence deciding punishment. Over ninety-five percent of defendants, therefore,
do not get the basic protection against faulty STS evidence that trial defend-
ants get. This may result in harsher sentences based on junk science that has
been admitted and considered without any screening or vetting.
This Article offers the first in-depth exploration of STS evidence at sen-
tencing. It links two bodies of literature: the first analyzing the negative effects
of junk science on the reliability of trials and the second arguing for extending
procedural protections to sentencing. This Article builds upon these literatures
by proposing an implementable mechanism for evaluating STS evidence at
sentencing while retaining special protections for criminal defendants. The Ar-
ticle recommends that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (or its state analog) apply
at sentencing to determine the admissibility of STS evidence offered in support
of harsher punishment, but not to such evidence offered by defendants as
mitigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, with his sentencing hearing just around the corner, T.K.,1
a seventeen-year-old in Washington, D.C., appeared set to head home
1 T.K. has given the author permission to disclose certain facts about his case. At the time
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for a period of probation. T.K. had pleaded guilty2 to a felony, and all
relevant parties—including the prosecutor and the juvenile probation
agency—agreed that incarceration was unnecessary. He was a consci-
entious student on the cusp of high school graduation, he was sur-
rounded and supported by a close-knit family, and he had, by all
accounts, taken every opportunity to turn his life around. As a result,
it appeared that the only issue left to be resolved at T.K.’s sentencing
was not whether T.K. should be sentenced to a period of probation,
but rather how long that period should be.
But the day before sentencing, the parties received the results of
a violence risk assessment, the Structured Assessment for Violence
Risk in Youth (“SAVRY”), that had been conducted as part of a rou-
tine psychological evaluation ordered by the court.3 The SAVRY pur-
ports to predict the likelihood of future violence or reoffending in
adolescents.4 According to the assessment, T.K. was a high risk for
committing future violence.5 It was a life-altering report that drasti-
cally changed T.K.’s prospects at sentencing.
The assessment was flawed, however. The SAVRY rates twenty-
four risk factors supposedly associated with a juvenile’s risk of violent
reoffending.6 An evaluator considers each of these risk factors and
assigns a rating of low, moderate, or high risk to each.7 Low risk trans-
lates to a numerical value of zero, moderate to one, and high to two.8
Once all factors are evaluated, the evaluator assigns a total risk
rating.9
of his adjudication, T.K. was a juvenile. In consideration of his privacy, T.K.’s full name and case
number have been withheld. All records relating to T.K.’s case are on file with the author.
2 Because he was a juvenile, T.K. was charged in a juvenile delinquency case within the
Family Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court, rather than the Criminal Division,
where his case would have been heard had he been an adult at the time of his arrest. The juve-
nile delinquency equivalent of a sentencing hearing is a “disposition hearing.” See D.C. SUPER.
CT. JUV. R. 32. For reader ease, traditional criminal case terminology instead of juvenile delin-
quency-specific terminology is used throughout this article when referring to T.K.’s case.
3 See Order at 2, In re T.K. (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018).
4 See Gina M. Vincent, Laura S. Guy, Samantha L. Fusco & Bernice G. Gershenson,
Field Reliability of the SAVRY with Juvenile Probation Officers: Implications for Training, 36
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 225, 226 (2012).
5 Order, supra note 3, at 3. R
6 RANDY BORUM, PATRICK BARTEL & ADELLE FORTH, MANUAL FOR THE STRUCTURED
ASSESSMENT OF VIOLENCE RISK IN YOUTH 7 (version 1 consultation ed. 2002). Examples include
“History of Violence,” “Peer Delinquency,” and “Substance Use Difficulties.” Id. at 28, 58, 84.
The SAVRY also considers “protective factors” that mitigate against risk. Id. at 9–10.
7 Id. at 17.
8 Id. at 22.
9 See id. at 17.
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But, in T.K.’s case, the examiner misapplied the tool. First, she
improperly double-counted certain behaviors by listing them in multi-
ple categories, an inappropriate method of risk evaluation using the
SAVRY.10 Second, the evaluator made an arithmetic error: she miscal-
culated the total number of elevated risk factors, assigning T.K. more
elevated risk factors than were present in her own assessment.11 To
top it off, the evaluator incorrectly assessed T.K.’s risk of future dan-
gerousness as “high,” when her own data justified only a “low,” or at
most, “moderate” risk rating.12 In short, she never should have found
that T.K. was a high risk of future dangerousness,13 but nevertheless,
T.K.’s future changed overnight.
T.K.’s case is not atypical: judges regularly rely on risk assess-
ments and other flawed scientific evidence at sentencing hearings.14
This is particularly troubling because today, the overwhelming major-
ity of criminal defendants plead guilty and proceed to sentencing with-
out ever having a trial.15 Their cases are functionally resolved at
sentencing,16 where there is no meaningful way to screen out junk sci-
ence and prevent judges from relying on the type of flawed evidence
supplied in T.K.’s case.
After reviewing the SAVRY results, both the prosecutor and pro-
bation agency rescinded their recommendations for T.K. to be placed
on probation and, instead, asked for him to be committed to the cus-
tody of the local youth rehabilitation agency.17 Commitment would
mean that, rather than being free to attend one of the colleges to
which he had been admitted, T.K. could spend years at a secure deten-
tion facility—a euphemistic term for what is, in effect, prison for
children.18
10 See Order, supra note 3, at 5, 8. An example of double-counting might include listing a R
school fight in considering multiple risk factors, such as both the history of violence risk factor
and the risk taking/impulsivity risk factor rather than listing it for one or the other. See id.
11 Motion to Exclude Results of the Violence Risk Assessment and All Related Testimony
and/or Allocution Under FRE 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals at 13, In re
T.K. (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Motion to Exclude].
12 See id. at 13–14.
13 See Order, supra note 3, at 8–9. R
14 See discussion infra Section I.B.
15 See Clark Neily, Jury Empowerment as an Antidote to Coercive Plea Bargaining, 31 FED.
SENT’G REP. 284, 284 (2019) (“[M]ore than 95 percent of criminal convictions are obtained
through guilty pleas . . . .”).
16 See Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 177
(2017).
17 See Motion to Exclude, supra note 11, at 2. R
18 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 1200.4 (2017) (giving the Department of Youth Rehabili-
tation Services (“DYRS”) “sole discretion to make specific placement decisions for youth com-
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T.K. sought to challenge the admissibility of the risk assessment
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility
of expert evidence at trial.19 He argued, through an expert in psychol-
ogy and risk assessments, that the risk assessment in question is unre-
liable in predicting future violence and that, even if the tool were
generally reliable, it is not reliable as applied to his case.20
But as T.K.’s judge noted, Rule 702 does not apply at sentenc-
ing.21 As a result, T.K.’s prospects for leniency were seriously dimin-
ished as the prosecutor and probation department requested a harsher
sentence than they had sought prior to reading the unreliable report.22
There is widespread agreement that evidentiary rules applied at
trial, including expert admissibility tests, are important in that they aid
in the search for truth and promote fair outcomes.23 But because Rule
702 and other rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing,24 judges
often make extremely consequential punishment decisions based on
unreliable or untested evidence. All over the country, in federal juris-
dictions and the many states that have adopted Rule 702 or a similar
rule, criminal defendants find themselves in the same shoes that T.K.
did in 2018. At sentencing, defendants are vulnerable to the use of
flawed scientific evidence in a way they would not be at trial, where
Rule 702 and similar state rules serve to filter out unreliable scientific,
technical, and specialized evidence (“STS evidence”), or junk sci-
ence.25 STS evidence may constitute junk science because (1) the un-
mitted to its custody”); see also Committed Youth, D.C. DEP’T OF YOUTH REHAB. SERVS., http://
dyrs.dc.gov/service/committed-youth [https://perma.cc/8YJY-UHZM] (allowing DYRS to place
committed youth in secure facilities).
19 FED. R. EVID. 702. The Federal Rules of Evidence govern proceedings in federal courts.
FED. R. EVID. 101. At the time of T.K.’s case, Rule 702 had recently been adopted by the Dis-
trict of Columbia as its expert admissibility standard. Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 752
(D.C. 2016) (en banc).
20 Order, supra note 3, at 3–4. R
21 See id. at 7.
22 See Motion to Exclude, supra note 11, at 2. R
23 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (explaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence “should be
construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly . . . to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination”).
24 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101.
25 Rule 702 applies to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” FED. R.
EVID. 702; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999) (finding that
Rule 702 applies not just to scientific knowledge, but scientific, technical, and other specialized
knowledge). For ease, in this Article, scientific, technical, or other specialized evidence is re-
ferred to as “STS evidence.” Examples of STS evidence may include psychological or psychiatric
information contained in presentence investigation reports; DNA, fingerprint, ballistics or other
traditional forensic identification evidence; evidence resulting from use of risk-assessment tools;
and medical information and other, similarly specialized information. STS evidence that would
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derlying science itself is inherently unreliable, (2) an otherwise valid
method is misapplied to produce faulty results, or (3) forensic examin-
ers exaggerate results.26 Judicial reliance on such evidence may di-
rectly contribute to a criminal defendant spending more days, weeks,
years, or even decades in prison.
This Article argues that the frequent use of often flawed STS in-
formation at sentencing, coupled with how critical the sentencing
stage is to the administration of criminal justice, necessitates greater
scrutiny of such evidence than is currently applied in sentencing deci-
sions. It offers the first in-depth exploration of STS evidence at sen-
tencing. It bridges the extensive scholarship on junk science at the
trial stage with scholarship advocating for extension of procedural
protections to sentencing. And it further builds upon these literatures
by proposing an implementable mechanism for evaluating STS evi-
dence at sentencing while retaining special protections for criminal
defendants.
This Article proposes that Rule 702 and its state analogs be ex-
tended in a modified, asymmetrical format to sentencing. Specifically,
it proposes that the same types of evidence that would be subject to
Rule 702’s admissibility test at the trial stage be subject to the Rule
702 admissibility test at sentencing, when offered by the prosecution
or probation officer as support for harsher punishment, but not when
offered by a defendant for mitigation purposes.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the need for
increased examination of the use of STS evidence at sentencing. It
first details the role flawed scientific evidence has played in contribut-
ing to troubling outcomes at the trial phase. It then lays out the critical
importance of the sentencing stage in the modern criminal legal sys-
tem and describes the ways in which STS evidence is used at sentenc-
ings today. Finally, Part I explains the operation of Rule 702 at trial
and contrasts the Rule with what little exists in the way of a legal
standard to filter out unreliable evidence at sentencing. Part II pro-
poses a mechanism for screening unreliable STS evidence at sentenc-
ing that (1) is calculated to improve sentencing accuracy, (2) allows
judges to consider a broad range of information, and (3) avoids com-
promising defendants’ ability to present mitigating evidence. It sug-
gests that when STS evidence is offered by the prosecutor or a neutral
party in support of an argument for an increased sentence, it be sub-
not meet the admissibility test laid out in Rule 702 is referred to throughout this article as “junk
science.”
26 See FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(c).
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jected to the admissibility test in Rule 702 or the state equivalent—but
that STS evidence offered by a defendant at sentencing need not be
subjected to such a test. It then evaluates this proposal on a number of
dimensions. Part III analyzes a sampling of previous recommenda-
tions to improve sentencing accuracy and increase protections for
criminal defendants at sentencing. It then considers their suitability
for filtering out junk science at sentencing, concluding that while valu-
able in their own right, none of these recommendations adequately
addresses the problem of junk science at sentencing.
I. SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED EVIDENCE
AT SENTENCING
This Part provides three layers of background on the need for
closer examination of the use of STS evidence at sentencing. It first
explains why more attention must be paid to STS evidence at sentenc-
ing by outlining the importance of, and the stakes at issue for criminal
defendants at, that phase. Second, it outlines the types of STS evi-
dence used in sentencings today. Finally, it describes the gatekeeping
role of Rule 702 at trial and compares this with the far more lenient
standard governing what information can be considered at sentencing.
A. The Significance of the Sentencing Stage
Much attention is paid to the use of STS evidence at the trial
stage of criminal cases. This Section begins to build the case that
greater attention must be paid to the use of such evidence at sentenc-
ing, as sentencing hearings have become the most important phase of
our modern plea-bargain-focused criminal legal system.
1. The Impact of Junk Science in Criminal Cases
Though wrongful convictions only represent a tiny slice of the
pie, they are important to understanding the negative impacts junk
science can have in criminal cases. Concrete evidence of the role that
flawed STS evidence has played in contributing to miscarriages of jus-
tice stems from considerable study of wrongful convictions. That evi-
dence helps shed light on how to approach junk science at sentencing,
which represents the vast majority of the pie.
Unreliable STS evidence is a leading cause of a variety of unjust
outcomes in criminal cases, including wrongful convictions.27 The first
27 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 84–117 (2011) (dis-
cussing invalid and unreliable forensic science at trials of wrongly-convicted defendants).
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study examining expert testimony in the cases of people who were
later exonerated found that flawed expert evidence was involved in
sixty percent of verified false convictions.28 The National Registry of
Exonerations lists “False or Misleading Forensic Evidence” as a con-
tributing factor in twenty-four percent, or a total of 644 documented
exonerations.29 The Innocence Project calculates the percentage of
cases in which problematic use of expert evidence contributed to ex-
onerations as even higher; it lists misapplication of forensic science as
a contributor to forty-three percent of DNA exonerations.30 As troub-
ling as those statistics are, however, they are likely to be underesti-
mates; it is probable that flawed STS evidence has contributed to
additional wrongful convictions that have not yet been—and may
never be—uncovered.
No one type of flawed STS evidence is responsible for unjust out-
comes. An abundance of examples exists across a variety of disciplines
of faulty or misapplied expert evidence contributing to troubling out-
comes in criminal cases. As described in Section I.C., for example,
junk psychology famously contributed to the imposition of a death
sentence for Duane Buck, who was convicted of a double homicide
that occurred in 1995.31 In 2004, Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield was
wrongfully detained in connection with the 2004 Madrid train bomb-
ings on the basis of a false fingerprint identification.32 There are many
28 See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2009) (finding invalid forensic testimony was of-
fered in 82 out of 137 cases studied).
29 See % Exonerations by Contributing Factors, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R5CK-W72H].
30 DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://
www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/LY9N-
X99A].
31 See Matthew Haag, Texas Man’s Death Sentence Thrown Out Over Racist Testimony,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/us/duane-buck-death-sen-
tence.html [https://perma.cc/VN3W-CUKY]. The sentence was eventually overturned by the
United States Supreme Court. See id.
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HAN-
DLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 OIG REPORT], https://
oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/s0601/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDT4-EY2V]. In
fact, Mayfield’s print was falsely identified by not one, but three FBI fingerprint examiners and
an independent, court-appointed fingerprint expert. See id. at 1–3. His wrongful detention led to
years-long discussion about the validity of fingerprint examination and comparison in both the
legal and scientific communities. See, e.g., 2006 OIG REPORT, supra; Simon A. Cole, More Than
Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
985 (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S PRO-
GRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
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additional examples of troubling outcomes based on faulty fingerprint
methods.33
Santae Tribble spent 23 years in prison after a 1980 murder con-
viction based largely on a claim by an FBI hair examiner that his hair
matched a hair found at a crime scene.34 The FBI examiner was
wrong; the hair found at the crime scene was a dog hair.35 Hair com-
parison analysis has produced some of the most widely publicized
wrongful convictions;36 in 2015, after years of concern over the validity
of hair analysis, the Department of Justice finally admitted that its
hair examiners had been giving flawed testimony for over 20 years.37
Even DNA analysis—often thought of as the gold standard of
forensic identification methods—is not immune to misuse and misap-
plication. In 2011, Adam Scott’s DNA was found to match a sperm
sample from a rape kit.38 But Scott lived over 200 miles away from—
and had never visited—the city in which the rape took place.39 Scott’s
was not an isolated incident. A 2018 study by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) found that DNA analysts across
labs analyze DNA in vastly different—and often erroneous—ways.40
REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2011),
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/s1105.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AYK-
NXME]; WILLIAM THOMPSON, JOHN BLACK, ANIL JAIN & JOSEPH KADANE, AM. ASS’N FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY AND GAP ANALYSIS,
LATENT FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS (2017), https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/re-
ports/Latent%2520Fingerprint%2520Report%2520FINAL%25209_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z9VJ-3CV7].
33 See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Richard Jackson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Mar.
18, 2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3318
[https://perma.cc/BD2Z-Y374]; Jeff Chinn, Fingerprint Expert’s Mistake Leads to Wrongful Con-
viction in Indiana, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2012), https://californiainnocenceproject.
org/2012/10/fingerprint-experts-mistake-leads-to-wrongful-conviction-in-indiana/ [https://
perma.cc/5MFJ-87E7].
34 Santae Tribble, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/santae-
tribble/ [https://perma.cc/7F8P-PYUY].
35 Id. In 2012, Tribble was finally exonerated. Id.
36 See, e.g., Korey Wise, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
korey-wise/ [https://perma.cc/7YHU-2LWD].
37 See Spenser S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades, WASH. POST
(Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-
matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcf
abc310_story.html [https://perma.cc/2HYZ-78MF].
38 Naomi Elster, How Forensic DNA Evidence Can Lead to Wrongful Convictions,
JSTOR: DAILY (Dec. 6, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/forensic-dna-evidence-can-lead-wrongful-
convictions/ [https://perma.cc/C39M-37H8].
39 Id.
40 See John M. Butler, Margaret C. Kline & Michael D. Coble, NIST Interlaboratory Stud-
ies Involving DNA Mixtures (MIX05 and MIX13): Variation Observed and Lessons Learned,
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In the study, which asked examiners from 108 labs across the country
to analyze various DNA mixtures, analysts found a person’s DNA to
be present where it was not more than seventy times.41 DNA mistakes
are not confined to governmental studies; there are many real-life
cases where misunderstood or misapplied DNA analysis contributed
to concerning results in criminal cases.42
There are a myriad of other examples of STS evidence leading to
unreliable convictions that cost people decades of their lives.43 Troub-
lingly, each type of STS evidence described above continues to be
widely used in criminal cases today.44 The role played by flawed expert
evidence in false and unreliable convictions has been the subject of
increasing national attention by academics, the media, and others.
Scholars from the legal and scientific communities have gone to great
lengths to bring attention to the role junk science has played in unfair
trial outcomes.45 As these communities have continued to sound the
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS, Nov. 2018, at 81, 92–93 (discussing the designs, observations,
and findings of NIST studies of DNA mixture interpretation in 2005 and 2013).
41 Id. at 87–91; see Greg Hampikian, Opinion, The Dangers of DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/opinion/the-dangers-of-dna-testing.html
[https://perma.cc/S9BB-8T8Z].
42 See, e.g., Katie Worth, Framed for Murder by His Own DNA, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Apr. 19, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/04/19/framed-for-murder-by-
his-own-dna [https://perma.cc/GAK3-Z82U]; Marina Medvin, Framed by Your Own Cells: How
DNA Evidence Imprisons the Innocent, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/marinamedvin/2018/09/20/framed-by-your-own-cells-how-dna-evidence-
imprisons-the-innocent/#7762bb424b86 [https://perma.cc/ZT85-5HEN] (discussing the impact of
DNA on Amanda Knox’s now-overturned conviction).
43 See, e.g., Radley Balko & Tucker Carrington, Bad Science Puts Innocent People in Jail—
And Keeps Them There, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/bad-science-puts-innocent-people-in-jail—and-keeps-them-
there/2018/03/20/f1fffd08-263e-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html [https://perma.cc/5V87-
SN9E] (describing problems with purported shaken baby syndrome evidence and explaining that
bitemark analysis has led to dozens of wrongful convictions).
44 See Jules Epstein, Preferring the “Wise Man” to Science: The Failure of Courts and Non-
Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in Forensic Matching Testimony, 20 WIDENER L.
REV. 81, 101–06 (2014) (explaining that courts continue to admit pattern and impression evi-
dence such as latent fingerprint, handwriting, and firearms analysis); see also PRESIDENT’S COUN-
CIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1–14
(2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC4M-F8P5]
(considering DNA, fingerprint, and hair analysis among other disciplines in report on validity of
forensic science evidence used in “the Nation’s legal system”).
45 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, But Still Defended Revising
State Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095, 1098–100 (2018); M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker
Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Sciences Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4
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alarm about the misapplication of and overreliance on STS evidence,
the media, too, has joined the chorus warning of the consequences of
admitting junk science evidence at trial.46
Even former President Barack Obama entered the growing na-
tional conversation about misuse of expert evidence. In a 2017
Harvard Law Review commentary published just before he left the
White House, the former President described a need to improve fo-
rensic sciences and described efforts made by his administration to
effect such change.47 These efforts included the publication of a
landmark report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology which assessed the validity of a number of forensic
science disciplines in 2016.48 Its conclusions were jarring: a number of
traditional forensic science disciplines lack foundational validity, even
some like firearms and toolmark analysis, which have been regularly
admitted by courts for decades.49
That the need to improve the use of STS evidence in criminal
cases is at the forefront of legal and public consciousness is due, in
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 93–112 (2016); Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 28; Jonathan J. Koehler, Foren- R
sics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1369,
1389–98 (2017); Brandon L. Garrett & M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the Reliability Test, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1559 (2018); Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 869 (2018); Keith A. Findley, Reforming the ‘Science’ in Forensic Science, WIS.
LAW., Nov. 2015, at 32, 33. See generally NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (report-
ing the results of a congressionally-mandated study on, and making recommendations to im-
prove, forensic science); PCAST REPORT, supra note 44 (reviewing previous research on the R
validity of forensic science, evaluating scientific validity of common forensic evidence tech-
niques, and making recommendations to improve the validity of forensic evidence).
46 See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Forensic Science (HBO Oct. 1, 2017),
https://youtu.be/ScmJvmzDcG0 [https://perma.cc/AEF7-FR5A]; Radley Balko, Opinion, We
Need to Fix Forensics. But How?, WASH. POST (June 20, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/20/we-need-fix-forensics-how/ [https://perma.cc/
PU4J-2S94]; Hsu, supra note 37. R
47 Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Re-
form, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 860–62 (2017).
48 PCAST REPORT, supra note 44, at 4–6. R
49 See id. at 81–82 (noting that DNA analysis of complex-mixture samples lacks founda-
tional validity); id. at 87 (noting that bitemark analysis lacks foundational validity); id. at 95–102
(noting latent fingerprint analysis has a “substantial” false positive error rate and cautioning
against admission of the results of latent fingerprint analysis without informing jurors of the
limitations of the discipline); id. at 104–12 (noting that firearms analysis lacks foundational valid-
ity); id. at 117 (finding “no appropriate empirical studies to support the foundational validity of
footwear analysis to associate shoeprints with particular shoes based on specific identifying
marks,” though not “evaluat[ing] the foundational validity of footwear analysis to identify class
characteristics (e.g., shoe size or make)”).
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significant part, to the innocence movement.50 The innocence move-
ment has done much to expose the problematic reliance on scientific
evidence in criminal trials that resulted in wrongful convictions and to
enlist the public in advocating for criminal justice reform.51 But be-
cause the innocence movement focuses on the ways in which errors
lead to wrongful convictions, the conversation about flawed forensics
generated by that movement necessarily focuses on the trial stage of
criminal cases.52 The majority of criminal cases, however, never make
it to trial. From a numerical perspective, therefore, focusing on wrong-
ful convictions and their causes is focusing on a subset of the fraction
of convictions that come after a trial.
2. The Importance of Sentencing in Criminal Cases
From Law and Order to Legally Blonde, we are told in the news
and in books, movies, and television shows, that the most important
stage of a criminal case is a trial, in which skilled advocates present
evidence and make arguments, facts are revealed through robust
50 The innocence movement can be broadly described as a coalition of lawyers, journalists,
exonerees, and other activists working to free the wrongfully convicted and expose flaws in the
criminal justice system that have led to wrongful convictions. See Jenny Roberts, The Innocence
Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 780 (2018); Abbe Smith, In Praise of the
Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 316–17 (2009–2010); Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sus-
tainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955, 958, 997 (2013–2014). The key player in
the innocence movement is the Innocence Project, which, in more than twenty-five years of
work, has exonerated over 350 prisoners through DNA testing. DNA Exonerations in the United
States, supra note 30. R
51 See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1550–51; Andrew M.
Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful
Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1219–20 (2005).
52 See, e.g., Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence
Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189, 190,
192 (2015) (“Innocence movement scholarship has minutely examined most possible causes of
wrongful convictions . . . . The study of wrongful conviction narratives suggests that the standard
list of wrongful conviction causes does not capture all the ways that justice can miscarry, and that
trial processes may have generated or allowed wrongful convictions.”); Garrett & Fabricant,
supra note 45, at 1559 (“Critics, however, have pointed out that judges continue to routinely R
admit unreliable evidence . . . including flawed forensic techniques that have contributed to
convictions of innocent people later exonerated by DNA testing.”). Generally, criminal cases
resulting in convictions comprise three phases: (1) the investigation phase, where law enforce-
ment and prosecutors investigate potential charges against a soon-to-be defendant; (2) the pre-
trial and trial phases, which commence once a defendant is arrested; and (3) the sentencing
phase. For simplicity, this framework leaves out the variety of appeals and postconviction litiga-
tion that may take place after conviction, but which are not relevant to the discussion in this
Article.
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cross-examination, and jurors search for the truth.53 But this is a myth.
Trials occur in very, very few criminal cases.54 Indeed, the overwhelm-
ing majority of criminal cases—over ninety percent—are resolved not
after a trial, but as a result of a guilty plea.55 In 2012, the Supreme
Court acknowledged “a simple reality” that “[n]inety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas”56 and noted that “criminal justice today is
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”57 Even for
the small slice of criminal defendants who do take their cases to trial,
most are convicted and, thus, sentenced.58 The result is that the vast
majority of criminal cases end with a defendant being sentenced. This
means that, based on the numbers alone, sentencing hearings are
hugely important to almost all criminal defendants; they are the culmi-
nating event in the criminal process for the masses.
But it is not merely a numbers issue. As sentencings have
evolved, their importance to criminal defendants has grown signifi-
cantly. Around the time of the founding, judges had little discretion in
determining a sentence once a jury convicted a defendant.59 Sentenc-
ings were part of trials—the sentence was determined by the offense
53 See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 134 (2019); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1911 (1992).
54 See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most
Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-
guilty/ [https://perma.cc/2FWM-BC7G] (noting that two percent of federal criminal defendants
went to trial in fiscal year 2018 and perhaps an even smaller share of state criminal defendants go
to trial); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2017); Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-ir-
relevant/534171/ [https://perma.cc/ZL9G-KDZS]; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 53, at 1911. R
55 See Gramlich, supra note 54 (reporting that ninety percent of federal criminal defend- R
ants pled guilty in fiscal year 2018); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-
plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/ZC5L-99XQ] (“[I]t is a rare state where plea bargains do not simi-
larly account for the resolution of at least 95 percent of the felony cases that are not dis-
missed . . . .”); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”);
Neily, supra note 15, at 284 (“[M]ore than 95 percent of criminal convictions are obtained R
through guilty pleas . . . .”).
56 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
57 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170.
58 Gramlich, supra note 54 (reporting that in fiscal year 2018, most federal criminal de- R
fendants who went to trial were convicted).
59 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2000).
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and was, therefore, highly predictable.60 Because sentencing hearings
were not independent of trials, the same procedural protections ap-
plied to both.61
Modern sentencings are relatively complex, by contrast, and ex-
tremely consequential. Because most defendants proceed directly to
sentencing via a plea bargain, it is at sentencing hearings where factual
findings regarding a defendant’s conduct and characteristics are
made.62 In addition, sentencings have evolved to allow judges signifi-
cant discretion in fashioning a sentence.63
The entire criminal legal system has seen unparalleled expan-
sion.64 The massive explosion of America’s prison population over the
last several decades has also increased the significance of the sentenc-
ing phase. Although the prison population has begun to stabilize,65 the
number of individuals in prison today is over five times what it was in
the 1970s.66 The United States houses the most prisoners of any coun-
try in the world, and it has the highest incarceration rate of any coun-
try in the world.67 A whopping seventy percent of convictions result in
the loss of liberty.68
This prison explosion is largely the result of two key trends that
are decided at sentencing hearings: increases in prison admissions and
increases in time served in prison.69 In the thirty-year period from
60 Id.
61 Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sen-
tencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 51 (2011).
62 Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, 47
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 818 (2014).
63 See id. at 806–08; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 61, at 52–53. R
64 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html. [https://
perma.cc/FV6D-SXD4].
65 See Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/
criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/R4DG-VGAX].
66 See id. Under 200,000 people were in prison in 1972 compared to almost 1.5 million as
of 2017. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 1–2 (2017); Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarcera-
tion: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/5H3P-ME23] (listing a combined
total of over 1.5 million people in federal and state prisons, with 226,000 people in federal prison
and 1.291 million in state); Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 65. Note that the Prison Policy R
Initiative counts a total of almost 2.3 million people locked up in American state and federal
prisons, jails, and other facilities. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, supra.
67 Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 66. R
68 Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 64. R
69 See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 50–55 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter NAS REPORT ON MASS INCARCERA-
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1980 to 2010, the rate at which criminal defendants were sent to prison
increased by up to 350 percent.70 In that same time period, sentence
length increased by up to 238 percent.71
The takeaway is simple: sentencing has become such a critical
phase in criminal prosecutions not just because so many cases end
with sentencing, but also because sentencing outcomes are much har-
sher today than they were fifty years ago. Criminal defendants are
more likely to be sent to prison at sentencing, and they may spend
much longer there than in years past.72
There is more at stake for criminal defendants at sentencing than
just prison time. Convictions and the sentences that result may gener-
ate a whole slate of secondary consequences too: loss of jobs, income,
and access to benefits and voting rights; displacement of families; re-
duced access to health care; stunted education, not to mention stigma-
tization and much more.73
B. Scientific, Technical, or Specialized Evidence at Sentencing
The focus on the use of flawed scientific evidence on trial out-
comes would be one matter if this type of information were presented
only at trial. But STS evidence is regularly presented at sentencing
hearings. This Section begins by briefly describing the typical sentenc-
ing hearing. It then categorizes varieties of STS evidence considered
at sentencings today and examines how they are treated at that stage.
TION]; STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON?
26, 27 (2013).
70 The National Research Council reports the rate at which defendants were committed to
state prison for murder rose by more than 120% in that period. NAS REPORT ON MASS INCAR-
CERATION, supra note 69, at 50. The rates at which defendants were committed to prison for R
sexual assault, aggravated assault, and drug crimes all rose by over 200%: 275% increase for
sexual assault, 250% increase for aggravated assault, 350% increase for drug offenses. Id. at
50–51.
71 Id. at 53. Average time served for murder rose from five years in 1981 to almost 17 years
in 2000 (a 238% increase). Id. Average time served for other crimes rose as well, but not by as
much. Id.
72 See, e.g., RAPHAEL & STOLL, supra note 69, at 50–51. R
73 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 144–69 (rev. ed. 2012) (describing the wide variety of collateral
consequences associated with convictions and loss of liberty). There is a vast body of literature
on the subject of collateral consequences of a conviction. For an in-depth examination of these
consequences, see generally AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. SECTION, COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/nij/grants/251583.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBR4-GZ2U]; Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 457 (2010).
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1. The Typical Sentencing Hearing
Sentencing hearings follow a conviction, whether after a trial or
entry of a guilty plea. Typically, before the hearing, a governmental
agency conducts a presentence investigation that includes an interview
of the defendant.74 Following the investigation, a report containing
background information such as employment, educational and family
history, contacts with the criminal legal system, and more is provided
to the court and parties.75 The report may also contain a sentencing
guidelines calculation, if applicable, and may make a sentencing rec-
ommendation to the court.76 These reports increasingly also contain
STS information in the form of mental health information and the
results of risk assessments, a growing trend reflected in T.K.’s case.77
Sentencing hearings tend to be informal as compared to trials or
other robust evidentiary hearings.78 The parties may supply letters or
reports about the defendant’s character, history, and other topics rele-
vant to the punishment determination.79 After the parties supply evi-
dence and make arguments, a judge imposes the sentence.80 Judges
tend to have significant leeway in imposing sentences.81 Even in juris-
dictions that utilize some form of sentencing guidelines, judges typi-
cally retain significant discretion in sentencing decision making.82 This
discretion is by design.83
74 See Kimberly A. Thomas, Sentencing: Where Case Theory and the Client Meet, 15
CLINICAL L. REV. 187, 197 (2008).
75 See id. at 196–97; 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (“A United States probation officer shall make a
presentence investigation of a defendant that is required pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (noting that a
presentence report must include an interview of the defendant as well as information on the
defendant’s prior criminal record, financial condition, and other characteristics); see also, e.g.,
Presentence Investigation, U.S. PROB. OFF., S. DIST. IND., https://www.insp.uscourts.gov/
presentence-investigation [https://perma.cc/7JPK-WXXJ] (noting that the probation officer typi-
cally gathers information on family history, educational background, employment history, and
more).
76 See Thomas, supra note 74, at 196–97. R
77 See Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 57–58 (2018).
78 See Thomas, supra note 74, at 205 (“Sentencing hearings are not as constrained by the R
careful presentation of evidence that characterizes a trial. In fact, they often seem like free-for-
alls.”).
79 See Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should
Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 311, 314 (1994).
80 See, e.g., id. at 304.
81 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 74, at 206. R
82 See id.; Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 125, 135–36 (2018).
83 See infra Section I.C. Capital sentencings proceed differently. Capital trials are split into
two stages: the guilt-or-innocence phase (the equivalent of the trial in ordinary, non-capital
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At the typical sentencing, witnesses may never take the witness
stand; even if they do, their testimony is not confined by trial-stage
evidentiary procedures and most often, they are not subject to cross-
examination.84 This is not just a feature of practice; sentencing hear-
ings are largely informal because procedural and evidentiary rules at
this stage are lax or lacking entirely.85 Hearsay and character evidence
are admissible; rules of evidence do not apply.86
Most trial stage constitutional protections do not apply at sen-
tencing either. At trial, for example, the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a criminal defendant’s
guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.87 But at sentencing, the
government is not required to prove its case for punishment beyond a
reasonable doubt.88 Rather, its burden is the lowest it can be in crimi-
nal cases—a preponderance of the evidence.89 The Constitution also
guarantees a right to trial by jury; there is no constitutional right to be
cases) and the penalty phase, in which a jury has already found the defendant guilty but is decid-
ing whether to impose a death sentence. See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged
Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493,
502 (2015). In most jurisdictions, the jury must consider both aggravating and mitigating evi-
dence during the penalty phase. Id. Aggravating factors typically must outweigh mitigating fac-
tors before a death sentence can be imposed. Id. In general, an aggravating factor is a fact or
circumstance relating to the offense or the defendant that would justify imposition of the death
penalty. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1125 (2008). A mitigating factor is a fact or circumstance, usually relating to the
defendant’s character or culpability, that justifies withholding a death sentence. See id. In capital
states, specific aggravating circumstances must be proven before death can be imposed. See Rob-
ert Alan Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theo-
retical & Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. REV.
411, 459 (1992). Moreover, unlike in noncapital sentencings, the burden of proof in the penalty
phase of a death cases is the trial-stage standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
84 See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentenc-
ing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1976 (2005) (“[T]he Court has held that due process at capital
sentencing does not require the trial-like procedure of open-court testimony by witnesses subject
to cross-examination.”); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Value of Confrontation as a Sentencing
Right, 25 WIDENER L.J. 103, 127–28 (2016) (noting that counsel at sentencing hearings are “una-
ble to cross-examine testimonial statements that are material to punishment, which ties defense
counsel’s hands and leaves the defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test the evidence
that is material to punishment”).
85 See Thomas, supra note 74, at 205. R
86 Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 533, 541–43 (2016).
87 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970).
88 See Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1833–34 (2003).
89 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91–93 (1986) (concluding that the state need
only prove facts by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing stage to satisfy due pro-
cess). But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact that can
increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, other than a fact of a prior conviction, must
be decided by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
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sentenced by a jury.90 And, under the Sixth Amendment, criminal de-
fendants enjoy the right to confront the witnesses against them at that
trial, but this right does not apply at sentencing.91
2. Scientific, Technical, and Specialized Evidence at Sentencing
The lack of trial-stage protections makes sentencing hearings ripe
for admission of unreliable or unvalidated scientific evidence.92 The
major categories of STS evidence offered at sentencings today are de-
scribed next.
a. Predictive Tools and Aggravating and Mitigating Evidence
EVIDENCE-BASED TOOLS. T.K.’s case reflects a growing trend to-
wards use of risk assessment tools at sentencing.93 Risk assessments
aim to provide objective, accurate, data-driven predictions of an indi-
vidual’s likelihood to engage in future criminal behavior.94 A move-
ment to reduce the prison population and recidivism95 gave rise to a
90 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentenc-
ing . . . .”); see Michaels, supra note 88, at 1813. R
91 See Michaels, supra note 88 at 1835–42 (discussing how “the Supreme Court has never R
decided whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing” but noting existing limitations
on its application in the sentencing context); Sanders, supra note 62, at 793 (“[There is] reason to R
reconsider the applicability of confrontation principles at felony sentencing . . . .”).
92 A useful illustration is found in People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (in bank). In
that case, the prosecution offered baseless statistical evidence about the likelihood of the de-
fendants’ involvement in the alleged crimes. Id. at 38. The court found that the evidence, which
lacked an evidentiary foundation as well as a mathematical foundation, “distracted the jury from
. . . weighing the evidence . . . , encouraged the jurors to rely upon an engaging but logically
irrelevant expert demonstration, foreclosed the possibility of an effective defense . . . , and
placed the jurors and defense . . . at a disadvantage in sifting relevant fact from inapplicable
theory.” Id. Though the evidence in question was presented to a jury during a trial, id. at 33, it
demonstrates the power of persuasion that even utterly baseless STS evidence can have when it
is admitted without scrutiny.
93 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Dis-
crimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assess-
ment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCH. 489, 495–96 (2016); see also Matt
Henry, Risk Assessment: Explained, APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theappeal.org/risk-assess-
ment-explained/ [https://perma.cc/9T8P-AAZS] (providing an in-depth explanation of risk as-
sessments). Analysis of risk assessments for those purposes is beyond the scope of this Article.
Risk assessments are also frequently used in making pretrial detention, bail, probation, and pa-
role decisions. See Collins, supra note 77, at 57–58. R
94 See Collins, supra note 77, at 59; see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism R
Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 62 (2017) (“Advocates contend that, because risk tools more objectively
and consistently predict the likelihood of recidivism than the inevitable human guesswork of
judges, using the tools at sentencing will improve accuracy.” (footnote omitted)).
95 See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 93, at 489; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sen- R
tencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and
Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 586 (2009).
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desire for increased use of “Evidence-Based Sentencing,” or sentenc-
ing practices based on individualized rehabilitation plans that rely on
the conclusions of risk assessment tools.96 At least 20 states utilize risk
assessment determinations in sentencing decision making.97 In some
jurisdictions, risk assessments are ordered in every case that proceeds
to sentencing.98
Risk assessment tools are generally actuarial or statistical in na-
ture; historical or group data about the behavior of arrested or con-
victed individuals is used to determine the likelihood of a particular
individual recidivating.99 Risk assessment tools primarily come in one
of two styles: structured professional judgment tools (“SPJs”), like the
SAVRY, and instruments that utilize a computer software program to
predict risk.100 An SPJ is essentially a guided interview aimed at as-
sessing risk.101 The evaluator conducts an assessment using a checklist
of factors that theoretically correlate to risk.102 Typically, a score or
rating is assigned for each factor,103 and a total risk judgment is made
based on the ratings assigned for each factor.104 Software-based tools,
sometimes referred to as algorithmic risk assessments, eliminate the
need for a human evaluator. They operate as a “black box”; a com-
96 See Warren, supra note 95, at 585–87; Starr, supra note 93, at 809. R
97 Collins, supra note 77, at 60; Starr, supra note 93, at 809. R
98 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007 (West 2011); Monahan & Skeem, supra note
93, at 495; Starr, supra note 93, at 809 n.11. R
99 See Eaglin, supra note 94, at 68; Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. R
REV. 671, 671 (2015); Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm That Grants Freedom, Or
Takes It Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/technology/pre
dictive-algorithms-crime.html [https://perma.cc/H9BA-2WEY].
100 Stephen D. Hart, Kevin S. Douglas & Laura S. Guy, The Structured Professional Judg-
ment Approach to Violence Risk Assessment: Origins, Nature, and Advances, in 2 THE WILEY
HANDBOOK ON THE THEORIES, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDING 643,
643–44, 647–53 (Douglas P. Boer et al. eds., 2017); Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu &
Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/ar ti
cle/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/45M4-QYK3].
101 See Douglas Mossman, Allison H. Schwartz & Elise R. Elam, Risky Business Versus
Overt Acts: What Relevance Do “Actuarial,” Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for Judicial
Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization?, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 365,
392–93 (2011).
102 See Collins, supra note 77, at 63–64; BORUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 7–11. R
103 See Collins, supra note 77, at 63. R
104 See id. at 63–64; John Monahan & Jennifer Skeem, Introductory Discussion of the Sci-
ence—Research Approaches in Violence Risk Assessment, in 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K.
CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
§ 9:11 (2019).
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puter program, rather than a human evaluator, analyzes risk factors
and spits out the final risk prediction.105
Several concerns have been raised in both the scientific and legal
communities about the wisdom of relying on risk assessment tools to
aid sentencing decisions.106 These include that use of risk assessments
at sentencing is contrary to their intended purpose, that the tools are
embedded with problematic biases, and that risk assessments have
limited, if any, predictive value.
Perhaps the biggest criticism of risk predictions is that risk assess-
ment tools were never intended for use at sentencing.107 Risk assess-
ment tools are intended to assist authorities to design appropriate
rehabilitation programming after a sentence is imposed,108 and the de-
velopers of risk assessment tools have warned against using them at
sentencings to determine punishment. The result of this improper use
of risk assessments is that reliance on such tools at sentencing can
result in wholly unwarranted punishments.109
Factors considered in both types of risk assessment include crimi-
nal history, family criminal history, educational background, age, gen-
der, employment status, substance abuse history, and a number of
others.110 But in order for a risk assessment to be accurate, these fac-
tors, which are presumed to correlate with risk, must in fact be risk
predictors. Scholars have expressed concern that certain factors con-
sidered in risk assessments—like gender and other personal character-
istics—should not be treated as risk predictors or factored into
punishment decisions at all.111
Moreover, risk assessments rely on population data to make risk
predictions.112 This means that in order for a risk prediction to be ac-
curate, risk assessments must be validated113 on populations that re-
105 See Angwin et al., supra note 100; Metz & Satariano, supra note 99. R
106 See Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 537, 576–77 (2015); Collins, supra note 77; Monahan & Skeem, supra note 93, at R
501–08.
107 See Collins, supra note 77, at 61. R
108 Id. at 61.
109 Id. at 62–63.
110 See id. at 64; Klingele, supra note 106, at 577. R
111 See Collins, supra note 77, at 60–62. R
112 Id. at 60.
113 Validation refers to the process of demonstrating, through empirical testing, that a par-
ticular test or tool functions as intended and determining under what range of conditions it
functions properly. See Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 688
(2018).
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flect the populations to which the tool is applied.114 When risk
assessments are used to assess individuals who are insufficiently simi-
lar to the populations they were validated on, their predictive value
diminishes.115 For instance, the Static-99, a sex offender risk assess-
ment tool discussed below, was developed and validated largely using
incarcerated populations in Canada.116 But the rate of sex offending in
Canada is more than double the rate in the United States,117 diminish-
ing the predictive value of the Static-99 for evaluating Americans.118
Given the foundation in aggregate data, commenters have ex-
pressed concern that reliance on risk assessment tools will lead to sen-
tencing determinations that are not individualized and that risk
assessment instruments may not be accurate predictors of recidivism
with respect to any given individual.119 Courts have started to warn
against overdependence on risk assessments for this very reason.120
Former Attorney General Eric Holder worried that reliance on risk
sentencing would result in sentences based on “unchangeable factors
that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of a future crime
that has not taken place.”121 Among the biggest concerns over the reli-
ance on risk assessment tools, particularly algorithmic tools, is that
racial bias is embedded in the algorithms used to make risk predic-
tions.122 For example, instruments give high weight to characteristics
that correlate with race, like criminal history, zip code, and socioeco-
nomic status.123 Indeed, actuarial risk assessments have been found to
114 See Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 730 (2011).
115 Id.
116 John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually
Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 37, 53–54, 59
(2009).
117 Id. at 59.
118 Id. at 59–61; Hamilton, supra note 114, at 729–31. R
119 See Collins, supra note 77, at 95–96; Klingele, supra note 106, at 577. R
120 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶¶ 62–64, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749;
Commonwealth v. Redacted, No. 2015-590, 2016 WL 1460521, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 12,
2016).
121 Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference
(Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-
association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/9QNW-JGRL].
122 See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2222 (2019)
(“[A]lgorithmic crime prediction . . . appears poised to entrench the inexcusable racial disparity
so characteristic of our justice system, and to dignify the cultural trope of black criminality with
the gloss of science.”).
123 See Collins, supra note 77, at 102 (“Nevertheless, as scholars have noted, some of the R
seemingly less suspect actuarial risk factors correlate with race so strongly that they are essen-
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“disproportionately classify minorities and the poor as higher risk,
often due to factors outside their control.”124 One study found that,
after isolating for race, a widely used risk assessment tool, the Correc-
tional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions
(“COMPAS”), was seventy-seven percent more likely to find African
Americans to be at higher risk for committing future violence.125
Many risk assessment instruments have very low predictive
value.126 For example, the Static-99 is among the most commonly used
sex offender risk assessments.127 Researchers have described it as “not
much ‘better than a coin flip.’”128 As a result, it has been suggested
that a determination by the Static-99 that a person is a “high risk” of
reoffending is unreliable.129
Proper application of the tool is another key concern. Indeed, the
heart of T.K.’s challenge to the admissibility of the SAVRY results at
his sentencing was that the evaluator in his case misapplied the tool,
resulting in an unreliable prediction of his potential for future
violence.130
Risk assessment tools like the COMPAS, SAVRY, and the Static-
99 are being used more frequently and will likely continue to be relied
tially a proxy for this impermissible factor.”); Starr, supra note 93, at 819 (wondering “whether R
risk prediction instruments that classify defendants by demographic, socioeconomic, and family
characteristics can be . . . justified”); Metz & Satariano, supra note 99 (discussing “worry that the R
biases—involving race, class and geography—of the people who create the algorithms are being
baked into these systems”); Mayson, supra note 122 at 2222 (citing “profound concern about the R
racial impact of risk assessment”); cf. Will Douglas Heaven, Predictive Policing Algorithms Are
Racist. They Need to Be Dismantled., MIT TECH. REV. (July 17, 2020), https://www.technology
review.com/2020/07/17/1005396/predictive-policing-algorithms-racist-dismantled-machine-learn
ing-bias-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/MTZ7-6DCP] (“Though by law the algorithms do not
use race as a predictor, other variables, such as socioeconomic background, education, and zip
code, act as proxies.”).
124 Klingele, supra note 106, at 577; see generally Mayson, supra note 122, at 2218 (“Al- R
gorithmic risk assessment has revealed the inequality inherent in all prediction . . . .”).
125 See Angwin et al., supra note 100. The study found that the same tool was forty-five R
percent more likely to find African Americans “predicted to commit a future crime of any kind.”
Id.
126 See Collins, supra note 77, at 95–96. R
127 See R. Karl Hanson, Leslie Helmus & David Thornton, Predicting Recidivism Amongst
Sexual Offenders: A Multi-Site Study of Static-2002, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 198, 198 (2010);
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: Considering the
Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent
Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 140–41 (2015).
128 See Hamilton, supra note 114, at 728 (quoting Fred S. Berlin, Nathan W. Galbreath, R
Brendan Geary & Gerard McGlone, The Use of Actuarials at Civil Commitment Hearings to
Predict the Likelihood of Future Sexual Violence, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE 377, 381 (2003)).
129 Hamilton, supra note 114, at 727–28. R
130 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. R
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on by sentencing courts.131 Indeed, despite all these concerns and red
flags, the Model Penal Code instructs states to develop risk assess-
ment instruments to aid in sentencing decision making.132
TRADITIONAL MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL STATUS EVIDENCE.
Psychological or psychiatric information about a defendant’s mental
health or mental illness, cognitive functioning, or other mental status
data points has become ubiquitous in criminal sentencings, capital and
noncapital.133 In capital cases, psychological or psychiatric evidence is
regularly offered at the penalty phase, both as aggravating evidence
by prosecutors and as mitigating evidence by defendants. The same is
true in noncapital cases, and courts themselves often order psycholog-
ical evaluations to gather information about a defendant prior to sen-
tencing, like the judge did in T.K.’s case.134 Some jurisdictions go so
far as to require psychological reports at sentencing under certain cir-
cumstances.135 Likewise, the parties often supply their own psycholog-
ical or psychiatric reports for consideration by the court in the form of
affidavits, letters, or testimony.136
This type of information is used in myriad ways at sentencing. It
can shed light on a defendant’s mental illnesses, his learning or educa-
tional disabilities, the impact of drug use on the brain, or many other
aspects of a defendant’s mental condition.137 It can also be used to
inform treatment decisions and rehabilitation programming, assist in
assessing a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism, and help understand
131 See Collins, supra note 77, at 57, 60. R
132 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017); Monahan
& Skeem, supra note 93, at 494–95 (describing the Model Penal Code mandate); Richard E. R
Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP. J.
CRIM. JUST. 1, 7–8 (2009) (same).
133 See Shari N. Spitz, Psychiatric and Psychological Examinations for Sentencing: An Anal-
ysis of Caselaw From the Second Circuit in Comparison with Other Federal Circuits and the Gov-
erning Federal Statutes, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 133, 135 (2003) (analyzing “the various
federal statutes which enable a criminal defendant to obtain a psychiatric or psychological
examination”).
134 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 26.5 (allowing court to order mental health evaluation of
defendant before sentencing); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.140 (West 2020) (allowing court to
appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to report on defendant’s mental condition at the time of
sentencing where the defendant is found guilty but mentally ill).
135 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2522 (2020) (requiring, where mental condition will
bear significantly on the sentencing decision, a psychiatric or psychological examination of a
defendant prior to sentencing).
136 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 74, at 200 (“The lawyer could develop effective sentencing R
advocacy around [the] fact [of a client’s mental illness], including the testimony of relatives or
doctors, records of treatment or evaluations, or letters from counselors.”).
137 See id.
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how mental health conditions influence criminal conduct.138 Evidence
of cognitive abilities is particularly crucial in capital sentencings; evi-
dence of intellectual disability is a key aspect of capital mitigation be-
cause a death sentence has been found to be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause when imposed
against the intellectually disabled.139
Despite their prevalence, not all types of psychological and psy-
chiatric information are equally reliable or accurate. For example,
prosecutors frequently call psychiatrists or psychologists to testify on
the question of a defendant’s future dangerousness, which is treated as
an aggravating factor in most capital jurisdictions.140 Whether predic-
tions of future dangerousness are reliable, accurate, or have any basis
in science, however, is, at best, hotly debated.141 Fifth Circuit judge
Emilio Garza commented that “[t]he scientific community virtually
unanimously agrees that psychiatric testimony on future dangerous-
ness is, to put it bluntly, unreliable and unscientific.”142 Even so, the
Supreme Court has allowed the admission of psychiatric testimony on
future dangerousness in capital sentencings.143
Some well-known cases offer concrete evidence that sentencing
decisions have in fact been based on unreliable mental health evi-
dence and illustrate how that type of information—if unchecked—can
lead to unjust sentencing decisions. In 1997, Duane Buck was con-
victed of capital murder in Texas for killing his ex-girlfriend and her
friend.144 At the penalty phase, Buck’s own lawyer called a psycholo-
gist who testified that Buck was statistically more likely to be violent
in the future because he is Black.145 Despite the blatant falsity of this
claim,146 the jury was allowed to consider that testimony and imposed
138 See id.
139 See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014).
140 See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071.2(a)(2)(b)(1) (West 2019) (requiring a
finding be made by a capital jury “whether there is a probability that the defendant would com-
mit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”); see also
Denno, supra note 83, at 526; Gertner, supra note 86, at 543 (“Neuroscience testimony could R
well be offered by prosecutors to show aggravating factors and by defense lawyers to show miti-
gating factors. While [a recent series of] studies found no instance of the prosecution using
neurogenetic evidence as an aggravating factor in capital cases, the past may not predict the
future, particularly in noncapital cases where the rules are more relaxed.”).
141 See Abram S. Barth, Comment, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in
Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 507–08 (2007).
142 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring).
143 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898–99 (1983).
144 See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017); Haag, supra, note 31. R
145 See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767–69.
146 See, e.g., Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10
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the death penalty.147 Buck was ultimately saved from execution when
the Supreme Court found his counsel ineffective for admitting such
damaging testimony against his own client.148
The vast majority of criminal defendants are not so fortunate.
The introduction of unreliable scientific evidence at Buck’s sentencing
was, in quite literal terms, the difference between life and death. The
reversal of his death sentence did not lead to improvements to the
types of scientific evidence that can be considered at sentencing. Buck
was successful due to the introduction of “especially pernicious” ra-
cially discriminatory evidence presented by his own lawyer at his capi-
tal sentencing—a set of facts so egregious that they are unlikely to
ever be repeated.149 For those whose cases do not turn on such obvi-
ously discriminatory and unlawful testimony presented by their own
lawyers, there is no meaningful system in place to screen out unrelia-
ble STS evidence and prevent it from being relied upon to enhance
punishment.
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE. Neuroscience, the study of the brain
and nervous system, is also being used with increasing frequency in
sentencings.150 Typically, neuroscience evidence takes the form of
neuroimaging data, computer-generated images of the brain, or
nonimaging evidence resulting from tests administered by a medical
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 90 n.175 (1999) (describing how research has shown that, after
controlling for socioeconomic status, race is not a risk factor for violence); Jeffrey S. Swanson,
Charles E. Holzer III, Vijay K. Ganju & Robert Tsutomu Jono, Violence and Psychiatric Disor-
der in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. &
CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 761, 764–68 (1990) (“Race was not related to violence when socioeconomic
status was controlled.”); JOHN MONAHAN, HENRY J. STEADMAN, ERIC SILVER, PAUL S. APPEL-
BAUM, PAMELA CLARK ROBBINS, EDWARD P. MULVEY, LOREN H. ROTH, THOMAS GRISSO &
STEVEN BANKS, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISOR-
DER AND VIOLENCE 58 (2001) (“African Americans and whites residing in comparably disadvan-
taged neighborhoods showed no differences in their rates of violence.”). The Supreme Court
described the so-called expert testimony as reflecting “a particularly noxious strain of racial
prejudice.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 776.
147 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775–76 (explaining that defense counsel’s decision to call the psy-
chologist despite being aware of his view that being Black increased the likelihood that Buck
would be a future danger “fell outside the bounds of competent representation.”).
148 Id. at 779–80. After reversal, Mr. Buck reached a deal in which his sentence was re-
duced to life in prison. Alex Arriaga, Texas Death Row Inmate Duane Buck Has Sentence Re-
duced to Life After Supreme Court Orders Retrial, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://
www.texastribune.org/2017/10/03/high-profile-death-row-case-comes-end-guilty-plea/ [https://
perma.cc/SM4F-C9RZ].
149 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
150 See Denno, supra note 83, at 495; Bernice B. Donald & Erica Bakies, A Glimpse Inside R
the Brain’s Black Box: Understanding the Role of Neuroscience in Criminal Sentencing, 85 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 481, 483 (2016).
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professional151 in order to attempt to measure an individual’s brain
function as compared to normal brain function.152 Both imaging and
nonimaging data seek to shed light on brain operation and function-
ing. But neuroimaging allows visualization of injuries and other ab-
normalities in a brain; it allows us to see brain damage.
Neuroimaging can support a defendant’s arguments to mitigate
his sentence by highlighting physical causes for, or contributors to, the
offending conduct in question153 and is, therefore, increasingly being
offered as mitigating evidence in sentencings, especially in capital
cases.154 While not yet regularly used by prosecutors against defend-
ants,155 there is concern that prosecutors, especially in the capital con-
text, will introduce neuroscience evidence to support the argument
that defendants are likely to commit future crimes and, thus, more
severe penalties or death sentences are appropriate.156 For example,
brain scans revealing abnormalities in the amygdala, which regulates
moral socialization,157 or injuries to the frontal lobe, which “regu-
late[s] socially appropriate behavior” and impulsivity,158 could be used
to fuel arguments that a defendant is likely to be dangerous in the
future.159 Though this fear has not yet been borne out, commentators
are concerned that this will change in the future, especially in noncapi-
tal sentencings.160
Using neuroscience-based evidence to attempt to predict future
behavior or to evaluate past conduct to determine punishment poses
significant concerns. Brain scans can be manipulated by certain move-
ments or even by the subject thinking about specific things during a
scan.161 There is also an expectation that every brain structure controls
a particular aspect of behavior and that, as a result, an injury to a
151 See Donald & Bakies, supra note 150, at 484. R
152 See id. at 484–85.
153 See Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law: Have We Been Getting It
Wrong for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 449 (2016).
154 See Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence in
the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577, 627 (2016); Denno, supra note 83, at 499. R
155 See Denno, supra note 83, at 496–97. R
156 Donald & Bakies, supra note 150, at 495; see Gertner, supra note 86, at 543–44. R
157 Bennett, supra note 153, at 449. R
158 Barth, supra note 141, at 503. R
159 Denno, supra note 83, at 496–97. R
160 See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 86, at 543. R
161 See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 404–05 (2007) (“Simple movements of the tongue or
jaw will make fMRI scans unreadable. . . . [S]imply thinking about other things during a task may
activate other brain regions in ways that interfere . . . .”).
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particular structure would impact a specific type of behavior.162 But
the degree to which a behavior is regulated by a specific structure var-
ies significantly, both in general and from person to person.163 Differ-
ent individuals can exhibit similar behaviors despite a brain scan
revealing significantly different patterns.164 Additionally, interpreting
imaging results is complex and data can be misinterpreted.165 All of
this is to say that, like other forms of STS, faulty, misinterpreted, or
otherwise unreliable neuroscience evidence can lead to unjust sen-
tencing decisions if not properly screened for reliability.
b. Traditional Forensic Identification Methods
Traditional forensic identification methods such as DNA analysis,
fingerprint comparisons, and firearms and toolmarks comparisons re-
present a wholly different category of scientific or specialized evi-
dence used at sentencings. Unlike the forms of STS evidence
described previously, forensic identification techniques do not offer
information directly related to a defendant’s background, education,
risk, or personal characteristics. Rather, they seek to link a defendant
to evidence of other crimes to make the case that a defendant de-
serves a higher sentence because of uncharged or even acquitted con-
duct. For example, during a sentencing hearing, a prosecutor may
highlight DNA results—perhaps from a “hit” in a DNA database166—
that suggest that the defendant has committed additional uncharged
crimes beyond those for which she was convicted. The prosecutor
could use this to argue that the defendant is especially dangerous and,
therefore, merits a more severe sentence, notwithstanding the fact
162 See Adina L. Roskies & Kimberly Farbota, Evaluating Neuroimaging Results, in 2
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH
SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 20:49 (2019).
163 Id.
164 See Greely & Iles, supra note 161, at 382 (“Inter-subject variability is also a considera- R
tion . . . . [T]wo independent subjects [may] show different patterns of activation while their
behavioral performances are comparable.”).
165 See A.C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can In-
form the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099, 1156 (2015).
166 See Kimberly A. Polanco, Note, Constitutional Law—The Fourth Amendment Challenge
to DNA Sampling of Arrestees Pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004: A Proposed Modifica-
tion to the Traditional Fourth Amendment Test of Reasonableness, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 483, 489–90 (2005) (describing how DNA databases are maintained); Frequently Asked
Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/
laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/PM6X-5W9N];
Kimberly A. Wah, A New Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting
Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 909, 916 (2008).
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that she was not charged with or convicted of the other crimes.167 But
as described previously, even the results of DNA analysis cannot be
assumed to be reliable.168
Prosecutors might similarly offer evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct based on fingerprint or ballistics matches to argue that the defen-
dant is guilty of additional crimes beyond those for which he has been
convicted. For example, in a burglary case, a prosecutor may offer evi-
dence that the defendant’s fingerprints were found at additional crime
scenes to support a claim that the defendant committed additional
burglaries.169 The same is true with respect to ballistics evidence—
prosecutors may argue for higher sentences by linking ballistics pat-
terns from a gun associated with the accused to ballistics recovered in
uncharged cases.170
Fingerprint and ballistics comparisons are two examples of what
are commonly described as “pattern matching” evidence, in which
markings, or patterns, on an item with an unknown source, such as a
latent fingerprint lifted from a crime scene, are compared to patterns
on a known source, such as a fingerprint deposited by an identified
suspect.171 The reliability of pattern matching techniques is frequently
questioned, largely because pattern analysis relies on the subjective
167 See, e.g., Alix v. Quarterman, 309 F. App’x 875, 877 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing prosecu-
tion’s introduction, in sentencing phase of capital murder trial, of faulty DNA evidence linking
defendant to unrelated homicide); People v. Pitts, 2013 IL App (3d) 110676-U, ¶ 6 (describing
persuasiveness of State’s presentation of defendant’s uncharged sexual assaults based on DNA
linkages); State v. Gatewood, 2001 WI App 280, ¶¶ 6–9, 248 Wis. 2d 982, 638 N.W.2d 394 (find-
ing due process violation when trial court relied on DNA results that were not provided to
defendant but which prosecutor argued at sentencing linked him to two uncharged assaults).
168 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. R
169 See B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Court’s Right, in Imposing Sentence, to Hear Evidence of,
Or to Consider, Other Offenses Committed by Defendant, 96 A.L.R.2d 768, § 10(f) (1964) (“Re-
jecting the objection of lack of proper authentication, the court in Murphy v State (1944) 184 Md
70, 40 A2d 239, . . . approved the sentencing judge’s use of an FBI record to show the defen-
dant’s previous criminal record, stating that while that record was not certified in any manner, it
showed on its face that it was based on fingerprints, of which the court took judicial notice as an
infallible means of identification, and pointing out that it was not claimed that the record was
false or inaccurate.”); Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at
Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REV. 235, 235 (2009) (“In deciding a defendant’s sentence, a court may
consider conduct that has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and even conduct of
which the jury has acquitted the defendant. Consideration of acquitted conduct has resulted in
dramatic increases in the length of defendants’ sentences . . . .”).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 651 n.10 (4th Cir. 2010).
171 See Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in “Blind” Justice: Expert Perception,
Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. &
REV. 161, 161 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-1\GWN102.txt unknown Seq: 29 22-JAN-21 15:02
80 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:52
interpretations of an examiner.172 In 2016, the President’s Council of
Advisers on Science and Technology, in a landmark report assessing
the validity of several traditional forensic identification methods,
found bitemark analysis and firearms and toolmark analysis to lack
foundational validity.173 The same report noted several issues with re-
spect to the reliability of fingerprint analysis including a substantially
high false positive rate.174
Courts have started to take notice of the flaws of such disciplines
and, in some cases, have begun limiting their admissibility at trial.175
But admissibility rules do not apply at sentencing, which allows prose-
cutors to seek higher sentences based on purported linkages to other
crimes using pattern-matching techniques for which no reliability as-
sessments have been conducted.
C. Comparing Trial-Stage and Sentencing-Stage Standards for
Admission of Scientific, Technical, or
Specialized Evidence
Rules of evidence and other procedural rules promote fair trials
and just outcomes by ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of
evidence admitted at the trial stage of a criminal prosecution.176 That
function is especially important in the context of STS information be-
cause STS evidence, by its very nature, contains conclusions that
laypeople—including judges—cannot reach on their own.177 Jurors
and judges view information presented with the label of “scientific,”
“technical,” or “expert” as having a stamp of authority and reliabil-
ity.178 Courts often warn that this “aura of special reliability and trust-
worthiness” creates the potential for confusing the factfinder and
prejudicing the defendant.179 As a result, faulty STS evidence has
172 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Reliable Application of Fingerprint Evidence, 66 UCLA L.
REV. 64, 66 (2018).
173 See PCAST REPORT, supra note 44, at 87 (assessing bitemark analysis); id. at 104–12 R
(assessing toolmark and firearm analysis).
174 Id. at 95–102.
175 See, e.g, Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 736 (D.C. 2019); State v. McPhaul, 808
S.E.2d 294, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017), disc. review allowed by 812 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 2018), disc.
review improvidently allowed by 818 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 2018).
176 Kelly, supra note 83, at 416. R
177 Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 45, at 1581 (experts can form opinions and reach con- R
clusions that lay witnesses cannot).
178 See, e.g., Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza J., specially
concurring); Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 753, 755 (D.C. 2016) (en banc).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that testi-
mony related to eyewitness identification “would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice
and confusion because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”); United States v.
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great potential to lead to unfair outcomes: unlike other evidence
which jurors and judges are well equipped to weigh and consider, evi-
dence that purports to be based in scientific or technical fields brings
with it a veneer of authority that creates a significant possibility of
causing undue prejudice. Because of all this, STS evidence is treated
differently than other evidence at the trial stage.
Rule 702 and state equivalents operate to screen out unreliable
STS evidence to avoid unwarranted reliance on junk science merely
due to its “aura” of scientific authority. But as described previously,
STS evidence is frequently used at sentencing as much, if not more,
than at trial.180 Still, no similar mechanism to screen STS evidence ex-
ists at sentencing.
This Section explains the critical role Rule 702 plays in screening
out unreliable STS evidence at the trial stage of a criminal prosecu-
tion. It first briefly describes how the Rule came to include a substan-
tive reliability test that functions to keep unreliable evidence out of
trials. In doing so, it reveals parallels between what motivated the de-
velopment of the modern version of Rule 702 and what motivates the
need for extension of Rule 702 to sentencing: the increased use of STS
evidence at each stage. It then compares Rule 702 to the minimal stan-
dard applied at the sentencing phase to determine what evidence may
be considered in punishment decisions.
1. The Trial Phase: The Rule 702 Standard
The danger of unwarranted reliance on STS evidence simply be-
cause it is labeled “scientific” exists for judges as well as juries, all of
whom, as nonexperts, are often ill equipped to grapple with scientific
evidence and tend to over-rely on information that is marked as hav-
ing the stamp of scientific authority when acting as factfinders. In its
landmark 2009 report, the National Research Council cautioned that
“judges and lawyers . . . generally lack the scientific expertise neces-
sary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed
manner.”181 Legal and scientific commentators have similarly warned
Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1199 (6th Cir. 1987) (warning that “‘the aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness’ which attaches to expert testimony admitted without proper foundation . . . may
confuse or mislead the trier of fact and thus defeat a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (quoting
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977))), aff’d and remanded, 487 U.S. 931
(1988); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Scientific or expert testi-
mony particularly courts the second danger [of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of
misleading the jury] because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.”).
180 See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. R
181 NAS REPORT, supra note 45, at 110. R
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that judges do not have the training or skill to adequately assess scien-
tific information182 and are also likely to be taken in by the “aura” of
information labeled as scientific.183
At the trial stage, federal jurisdictions and the many states that
have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to avoid the
problems created by misapplication of expert evidence by applying
the admissibility test codified in Rule 702.184 The rule plays an essen-
tial gatekeeping function at this stage, limiting admissible expert evi-
dence to only that which meets the Rule’s relevance and reliability
requirements. The modern iteration of Rule 702 provides that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and
182 See Kayla Marie Mannucci, Note, Framed by Forensics: Fulfilling Daubert’s Gatekeep-
ing Function by Segregating Science from the Adversarial Model, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947,
1955 (2018); see also Epstein, supra note 44, at 97–98 (discussing a “knowledge deficit” among R
lawyers and judges regarding scientific methods); Barbara A. Spellman in Radley Balko, Opin-
ion, How Much Should Juries Rely on Expert Testimony?, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/16/how-much-should-juries-rely-expert-testi-
mony/ [https://perma.cc/5SR8-USBP] (noting that judges along with jurors highly value forensic
evidence).
183 See Boaz Sangero, Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence, 34 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1129, 1135 (2018) (“[T]he ‘aura’ of science can be expected to blind judges and jurors and
lead them to overestimate the real probative strength of scientific evidence.”).
184 Jurisdictions which have adopted Rule 702 in its current iteration or a substantially simi-
lar rule are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. See ALA. R. EVID. 702; ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; DEL. R. EVID. 702; Motorola Inc. v.
Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-702
(2020); IND. R. EVID. 702; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456 (2019); KY. R. EVID. 702; LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 702 (2019); MASS. R. EVID. § 702; MICH. R. EVID. 702; MISS. R. EVID. 702; MO. REV.
STAT. § 490.065 (2020); N.H. R. EVID. 702; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 702 (2019); OHIO R.
EVID. 702; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2702 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-702 (2016); UTAH R.
EVID. 702; VT. R. EVID. 702; W. VA. R. EVID. 702; WIS. STAT. § 907.02 (2020); WYO. R. EVID.
702; see also Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 45, at 1572 n.74, app. II (listing the states that have R
adopted and use Rule 702 in criminal cases).
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(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.185
But the Rule did not always have such clear requirements. For
many years, two competing standards were used to assess the admissi-
bility of expert evidence in trials. Until Rule 702 was first adopted as
part of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,186 the prevailing stan-
dard courts applied was the “general acceptance” test proposed over
five decades earlier in Frye v. United States.187 Under that test, courts
admitted scientific testimony if the technique had been generally ac-
cepted by the relevant scientific community.188
The Frye standard is lax. Its approach is a “hands off” one that
allows judges to avoid meaningfully engaging with whether a given
scientific discipline is valid or not. Under the Frye test, that question is
left to the relevant scientific community; trial courts must decide
merely whether the evidence has gained general acceptance in that
community.189 Frye is not concerned with actual methodological
reliability.190
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence complicated the
question of how to determine the admissibility of expert evidence at
trials. The original version of Rule 702 was far more lenient than to-
day’s version, containing only the substance of subsection (a) of the
modern version of the rule: “If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .”191
It contained only two requirements, neither of which was de-
signed to address the scientific validity of expert evidence. These
were, first, that the evidence must be relevant and, second, that the
185 FED. R. EVID. 702. This version contains stylistic amendments added in 2011. See FED.
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
186 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
187 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
188 See id.
189 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980).
190 See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 393–94 (Alaska 1999) (“Frye . . . admits scientifi-
cally unreliable evidence which although generally accepted, cannot meet rigorous scientific
scrutiny.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 887, 899–900 (Alaska 2019).
191 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
§ 702 App.01, App.02 (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., Matthew Bender 2d ed.
2020).
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expert providing such evidence have basic qualifications.192 As a re-
sult, under the original Rule 702, admission of expert evidence at trials
was virtually unlimited. The problem with such a lenient standard
quickly became evident as courts frequently admitted allegedly scien-
tific or specialized evidence even if it was not based on objectively
sound methodology.193
Until the mid-to-late 1970s, expert evidence was thus liberally ad-
mitted in both civil and criminal trials.194 But two developments made
the need for better gatekeeping clear. The first was a surge in toxic
tort litigation, in which plaintiffs claimed that exposure to a variety of
substances caused various ailments, including cancer.195 Expert evi-
dence in these cases was frequently based on less-than-scientific
claims.196 The second development was the increased use of expert
evidence in criminal cases.197 Evidence based on a number of newly
developing disciplines like voice identification and bitemark compari-
son, among others, saw increasing use in criminal trials.198 As a result
of these two developments, courts were flooded with claims based on
unscientific evidence and began to seek more stringent admissibility
standards than those provided by the liberal Rule 702,199 with some
even returning to the Frye test’s “general acceptance” standard.200
As some judges reverted to using the Frye standard to respond to
the problems caused by the rapid acceleration of toxic tort litigation
on the civil side and the increased use of novel forensic identification
techniques on the criminal side, the question of whether Frye or Rule
702 should govern expert admissibility quickly came to a head. It was
finally resolved in the landmark 1993 case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.201
In Daubert, the Supreme Court found that Rule 702 had super-
seded Frye and held that trial judges must assess the reliability of pur-
portedly scientific evidence before admitting it.202 The Court noted
192 See id.
193 See David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 31–32 (2013).
194 See id. at 34–35; David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to
Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
195 Bernstein, supra note 193, at 34–35. R
196 See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 194, at 4. R
197 See Bernstein, supra note 193, at 34–35. R
198 See Giannelli, supra note 189, at 1198. R
199 See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 194, at 4. R
200 See id.; Bernstein, supra note 193, at 34–35, 40. R
201 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
202 Id. at 589–90.
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that, although helpfulness to the factfinder and general acceptance
were pertinent to an admissibility inquiry, the focus of the assessment
must be on the validity of the principles and methodology of any given
technique.203 In Daubert, the Court provided five substantive factors
that judges can use to evaluate scientific reliability.204 In a later case,
the Court emphasized that the Daubert standard applies not just to
scientific evidence, but to all expert evidence, including scientific,
technical, and specialized evidence.205 In 2000, Rule 702 was amended
to codify the Daubert standard.206 The current version of Rule 702 re-
flects that codification.207 Ultimately, Daubert and the subsequent
amendment of Rule 702 created a meaningful mechanism for courts to
reject the flawed scientific evidence that had become an increasingly
common feature of trials.
The Supreme Court later described the Daubert standard as con-
taining “exacting” reliability requirements for expert evidence.208 Sub-
sections (c) and (d) of Rule 702, which codify Daubert’s reliability test,
aim to ensure that STS evidence presented at trial is scientifically
valid.209
Rule 702(c) requires the principles and methodology underlying
STS evidence—whether DNA analysis, a psychological test, or any-
thing else—to be scientifically sound.210 Scientists have described this
requirement as “foundational validity.”211 For a technique to be con-
sidered foundationally valid, its conclusions must be repeatable, re-
producible, and accurate.212 In Daubert, the Supreme Court outlined a
list of nonexhaustive factors that may be used to evaluate whether a
methodology is reliable: (1) whether it can be or has been tested;
(2) whether the theory or practice has been published in scientific,
peer-reviewed journals; (3) whether the technique has a known or po-
203 See id. at 594–95.
204 See id. at 592–95.
205 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
206 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendment.
207 Id.
208 See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
209 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 n.9 (“In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”).
210 See FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
211 See PCAST REPORT, supra note 44, at 43. R
212 Id. at 5, 46–47. Repeatability refers to the idea that the same examiner will obtain the
same result upon multiple applications of a method under the same circumstances. See id. at 47.
Reproducibility refers to the idea that different examiners will get the same results upon applica-
tions of a method under the same circumstances. See id. Accuracy refers to obtaining the correct
result using a particular method. See id.
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tential rate of error, and what that rate of error is; (4) whether stan-
dards exist to control the technique’s operation; and (5) the
technique’s degree of acceptance within the scientific community.213
Subsection (d) focuses on a different aspect of reliability: the reli-
ability of the application of a method to a given set of facts. In other
words, assuming the reliability of the principles and methods of a
given discipline, subsection (d) asks if the method was reliably applied
to a particular case.214 Scientists have referred to this question as
whether a method has “validity as applied.”215 For STS evidence to be
admitted under Rule 702, the proponent must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that all admissibility requirements, including
those of subsections (c) and (d), are met.216
Consider an example in which a lab has validated its DNA testing
procedures only for samples containing mixtures of up to three con-
tributors of DNA but a prosecutor seeks to present evidence that the
defendant’s DNA is included in a mixture of five contributors—two
more than the procedure the lab has validated for. Although DNA
analysis is a generally reliable technique that might satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 702(c), the method may not have been reliably applied
to this particular case because it was used on a five-person mixture,
more than the lab’s validation allows for.
Parties may attempt to convince a judge of the reliability of prof-
fered expert evidence under Rule 702(c) and (d) in a variety of
ways.217 For example, they might offer literature supporting the valid-
ity of a method, hire an expert to discuss the method and its use in the
instant case, or provide the court with an affidavit or declaration con-
taining the expert’s conclusions.218 In cases involving complex issues
or novel evidence, the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing with
experts testifying about a method or its application in order to deter-
mine admissibility.219 Rule 702 limits the admission of expert evidence
that is unreliable by requiring the party proffering such evidence to
demonstrate it is objectively verifiable.220
213 509 U.S. 579, 592–95.
214 FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
215 PCAST REPORT, supra note 44, at 5–6. R
216 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendment (citing Bourjaily




220 See Bernstein, supra note 193, at 31. R
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Much as with the lead-up to Daubert, supposedly scientific evi-
dence is being used with increased frequency at sentencing today221
and is nearly unregulated. In the DNA example discussed above, were
the evidence offered at trial, the defendant would have a means for
arguing its lack of reliability under Rule 702(d) or the state
equivalent. But, at sentencing, the defendant would have no meaning-
ful basis for making such an argument and might suffer a harsher pen-
alty as a result. Just as a more stringent admissibility standard became
necessary to stem the flow of unreliable expert evidence at trials de-
cades ago, one is needed now to ensure that critical sentencing deci-
sions are not based on unsound STS evidence.
2. The Sentencing Phase: The Due Process Floor
So what keeps out junk science at sentencing? Not much. By and
large, trial-stage evidentiary rules do not apply at sentencing.222 In fed-
eral cases, the federal Sentencing Guidelines allow sentencing courts
to consider any “relevant information without regard to its admissibil-
ity under the rules of evidence applicable at trial,” so long as the infor-
mation has only “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy.”223 The standard is similar in federal capital cases224 and
221 See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. R
222 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101; ALA. R. EVID. 1101; ALASKA R. EVID. 101; People v.
Peterson, 511 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Cal. 1973) (in bank); COLO. R. EVID. 1101; State v. Young, 778
A.2d 1015, 1019–20 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); DEL. R. EVID. 1101; Chandler v. State, 534 So. 2d
701, 702–03 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R. 1101 (2019); State v. Hall, 419
P.3d 1042, 1089 (Idaho 2018); People v. Olson, 2019 IL App (2d) 170334, ¶ 26; IND. R. EVID. 101;
IOWA R. EVID. 1101; State v. Sims, 887 P.2d 72, 80 (Kan. 1994); KY. R. EVID. 1101; LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 1101 (2019); ME. R. EVID. 101; MD. R. EVID. 5-101; MASS. R. EVID. § 1101;
People v. Uphaus, 748 N.W.2d 899, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 879
N.W.2d 324, 329 (Minn. 2016); MISS. R. EVID. 1101; Martin v. State, 291 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009); MONT. R. EVID. 101; State v. Jenkins, 931 N.W.2d 851, 885 (Neb. 2019); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 47.020 (2019); N.H. R. EVID. 1101; State v. Hawkins, 719 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); State v. Smith, 797 P.2d 984, 987 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); People v.
Murray, 709 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 1101 (2019);
N.D. R. EVID. 1101; State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, 108 N.E.3d 1109, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); Wade
v. State, 624 P.2d 86, 91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.015 (2019); Com-
monwealth v. Medley, 1999 PA Super 20, ¶ 13; R.I. R. EVID. 101; State v. Gulledge, 487 S.E.2d
590, 594 (S.C. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-1101 (2016); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273,
289 (Tex. App. 2017); UTAH R. EVID. 1101; VT. R. EVID. 1101; State v. Hixson, 973 P.2d 496, 499
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Dunlap v. McBride, 691 S.E.2d 183, 193 (W. Va. 2010); State
v. Arredondo, 2003 WI App 7, ¶ 53, 674 N.W.2d 647; Peden v. State, 2006 WY 26, ¶ 12, 129 P.3d
869, 872 (Wyo. 2006).
223 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the back-
ground, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Gert-
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most state courts.225 That standard is derived from the extremely low
constitutional due process standard, which requires only that informa-
tion be “minimally reliable” in order to be considered at sentencing
hearings.226
The “minimal reliability” rule stems from Williams v. New
York,227 a seventy-year-old case widely considered to be the seminal
case on the question of evidentiary standards at sentencing.228 In Wil-
liams, the Supreme Court considered whether, as a constitutional mat-
ter, due process requires that traditional rules of evidence apply at
sentencing in the context of a defendant’s challenge to his sentencing
judge’s consideration of out-of-court statements contained in his pro-
ner, supra note 86, at 543 (discussing Daubert and Rule 702). This means that even prejudicial or R
confusing evidence can be admitted at sentencing. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
224 See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (“Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under
the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, or misleading the jury.” (emphasis added)).
225 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (2019) (“Any evidence which has probative value
and is relevant to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2019) (“Any such
evidence that the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissi-
bility under the exclusionary rules of evidence . . . .”); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564,
573–74 (Ind. 2010); cf. State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶ 47, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749
(holding that due process requires that sentencing be based upon accurate information). But
note that some capital-punishment states do maintain heightened procedural protections, includ-
ing application of state rules of evidence, at the penalty phase in death cases. See, e.g., Dumas v.
State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ind. 2004) (holding that the rules of evidence apply to the penalty
phase in capital cases).
226 See Gertner, supra note 86, at 542–43 (comparing the low standard of admissibility for R
evidence at sentencing with the higher standard of Rule 702); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d
313, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[D]ue process requires . . . some minimal indicia of reliability . . . .”
(quoting United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993))); United States v. McCarty,
628 F.3d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[D]ue process requires simply that ‘some evidentiary basis
beyond mere allegation in an indictment be presented to support consideration of such [un-
charged and unconvicted] conduct as relevant to sentencing.’” (quoting United States v.
Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1512 (6th Cir. 1992))); United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601,
606–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (reiterating that challenged information requires some “minimal indicium
of reliability” to be relied on in sentencing (quoting United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d
929, 936 (9th Cir. 2009))). But the minimal reliability rule is not designed to catch the most
problematic evidence. People v. Collins provides another useful example. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968)
(in bank). In that case, the statistical theory invoked by the prosecutor was itself sound. But
without a judge having first analyzed the reliability of the prosecutor’s statistical evidence, the
misapplication of that theory created a “mystique” that prevented the factfinder from assessing
its probative value and resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 41.
227 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
228 See Young, supra note 79, at 308–18; 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY R
J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(a) (4th ed. 2017); Michaels, supra note
88, at 1772. R
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bation report.229 The Supreme Court ultimately denied the defen-
dant’s challenge230 and, in its holding, set a very low bar for what
evidence can be considered at sentencing. Specifically, the Court held
that due process allows consideration of information at sentencing ir-
respective of whether such evidence would be admissible at trial.231
The Williams holding has since been interpreted to mean that due
process requires only that information be minimally reliable in order
to be considered at sentencing.232
Part of the Court’s rationale for creating such a lax evidentiary
standard was that judges must have as much information as possible
about a defendant’s behavior and character in order to fashion indi-
vidualized punishment and impose a proper sentence.233 The Court
emphasized that, historically, sentencing judges retained broad discre-
tion to consider a variety of information in making punishment deci-
sions.234 If trial-stage evidentiary procedures were applied at
sentencing, the Court reasoned, sentencing judges would be deprived
of much of the information on which they had historically relied.235
Ultimately, the Court decided that due process does not mandate
trial-stage evidentiary procedures at sentencing hearings, reasoning
that “[t]he due process clause should not be treated as a device for
freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure.”236
But the Court’s rationale for maintaining the historical status quo
in Williams was flawed: it prioritized judges’ purported need for a
breadth of information over accuracy of information.237 Commenta-
tors have criticized both the premise underlying that determination
and its ultimate wisdom. First, contrary to the Court’s rationale in Wil-
229 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 242, 244–45.
230 Id. at 252.
231 Id. at 251.
232 See, e.g., State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc); United States v.
Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1512 (6th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Sprauer, 358 F. App’x 871, 872 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1167 (11th
Cir. 1984); see also Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing:
Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses Be Applied?, 22 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1993) (“The essential nature of this regime [of indeterminate punishment] is explained
in Williams v. New York.”).
233 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247–48.
234 See id. at 246.
235 See id. at 250. The Court also expressed concern that the adoption of trial procedures at
sentencing would restrain courts from improving the administration of justice. Id. at 251.
236 Id. at 251.
237 See id. at 247.
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liams, judges had little discretion in sentencing decisions in the era of
determinate sentencing, the model in place at the time of the found-
ing.238 Second, and perhaps more importantly, many note that access
to accurate and reliable information at sentencing protects against un-
just results.239 Failure to screen out inaccurate STS evidence can con-
fuse the factfinder and cause overreliance on unfounded evidence.240
Williams stands for the idea that evidentiary standards are not
needed at sentencing to protect defendants’ right to due process be-
cause judges both need and have the ability to wade through large
amounts of information to arrive at the correct punishment decision.
But, the underlying facts of Williams, coupled with its trajectory fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s decision, undercut that very premise.
Samuel Tito Williams, the defendant in Williams, was an African
American man arrested and charged with the murder of a 15-year-old
white girl.241 The lone eyewitness to the murder, the decedent’s
brother, was present for the attack, but he was unable to identify Mr.
Williams as the perpetrator when police brought Mr. Williams to his
school for identification.242 In fact, the brother testified on cross-exam-
ination that the actual perpetrator was a white man who was seven
inches shorter than Mr. Williams.243 This eyewitness testimony so di-
rectly undermined the government’s case that, after it was completed,
the government told the trial judge that it was not relying on the
brother’s testimony to make its case.244 The only evidence of Mr. Wil-
liams’ guilt came in the form of coerced confessions that had been
secured as Mr. Williams testified at trial, after detectives had severely
beaten him.245 Mr. Williams nonetheless was convicted.246
238 Sanders, supra note 84, at 105–06, 117; see also Young, supra note 79, at 310–11 R
(describing the Williams Court’s failure to appreciate the rationale for not applying evidentiary
rules at sentencing during the era of determinate sentencing).
239 See Young, supra note 79, at 305, 310–11; Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, R
Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 222 (2014) (describing the argu-
ment that judges need “unfettered access to information” to make proper sentencing decisions
as “overly broad” in part because “[a]ccess to information is not an end in and of itself at sen-
tencing; rather, the reason for broad access to information is to allow a judge to impose a more
accurate sentence. . . . [P]rocedural rights . . . enhance the accuracy of the information provided
to the court.”).
240 See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38–41 (Cal. 1968) (in bank).
241 See Sanders, supra note 84, at 111; Lewis Wood, Judge Has Power to Impose Death, R
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1949, at 20.
242 See Sanders, supra note 62, at 796–97. R
243 Id. at 795, 797.
244 See Sanders, supra note 84, at 113–14. R
245 See Robert McG. Thomas, Man Freed in Slaying Wins Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
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The jury that convicted Mr. Williams declined to impose the
death penalty.247 The trial judge overrode that recommendation.248
Calling Mr. Williams “a ‘menace’ to society,” the judge sentenced him
to die by the electric chair.249
The probation report on which the sentencing judge relied in sen-
tencing Mr. Williams to the chair mirrors that considered almost sev-
enty years later by T.K.’s judge. It contained the very same type of
purportedly scientific information that was at issue in T.K.’s case and
that has become ubiquitous in sentencings today: psychological infor-
mation of questionable reliability regarding the defendant’s charac-
ter.250 Based in no small part on that report, the judge found Mr.
Williams to be a “psychopathic liar whose personality [wa]s perme-
ated with psychosexual habits of thought and conduct” who deserved
to be sentenced to death.251
The case of a man sentenced to death based on untested informa-
tion of questionable value after almost certainly being falsely con-
victed of murder is what forms the basis for our current standard for
the admission of STS evidence at sentencing hearings.252 In fact, in the
decades since, that holding has consistently been cited with ap-
proval253 and has been read to imbue trial judges with effectively un-
fettered discretion to admit and consider untested and potentially
unreliable information at sentencing hearings.254
After spending sixteen years in prison, Mr. Williams was granted
habeas relief in 1963 and released after his conviction was over-






250 See Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1948, at 48, https://times-
machine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/03/03/94940055.html?pageNumber=48 [https://
perma.cc/W98M-K3ZC].
251 Thomas, supra note 245. R
252 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 253 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The re-
cord before us indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive a man of his life, in
reliance on material made available to him in a probation report, consisting almost entirely of
evidence that would have been inadmissible at the trial.”).
253 See Young, supra note 79, at 316; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 228; see also Williams v. R
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (holding that under Williams v. New York, a “State’s Attor-
ney’s statement of the details of the crime and of petitioner’s criminal record—all admitted by
petitioner to be true—did not deprive petitioner of fundamental fairness or of any right of con-
frontation or cross-examination”).
254 See Sanders, supra note 84, at 105. R
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-1\GWN102.txt unknown Seq: 41 22-JAN-21 15:02
92 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:52
turned.255 Ten years after that, Mr. Williams was awarded $120,000 in
damages for malicious prosecution and false arrest.256 The trial judge
in Williams—who issued a death sentence based on a sentencing re-
port containing untested psychological information, leading the Su-
preme Court to establish a rule that evidentiary protections are not
needed at sentencing—seems to have gotten it entirely wrong.
Over seventy years later, as T.K.’s case makes clear, judges are
still getting it wrong by relying on flawed STS evidence at sentencing.
The stakes at sentencing today, though, are much higher than they
have ever been and are far too high to allow Williams to carry the day.
What follows is a proposal for an alternative rule that will enable
judges to adequately screen out junk science while allowing them to
consider relevant, important information about defendants at
sentencing.
II. EXTENDING RULE 702 TO SENTENCING
Williams set a floor, not a ceiling, for what is required before evi-
dence can be considered at sentencing. This Section advances a
straightforward proposal that states and rulemaking bodies can follow
to fill the gap created by Williams and prevent junk STS evidence
from being used against defendants at sentencings: extending Rule
702—which governs admissibility of the same type of evidence at the
trial stage—or its state equivalent to sentencing hearings when such
evidence is introduced against a defendant. In other words, it pro-
poses that STS evidence offered by the prosecutor or a neutral party
in support of an argument for an increased punishment—but not in-
formation offered by the defendant for mitigation—be subjected to an
admissibility test.
This approach would not overrule Williams. It would address the
shortcomings of that case while protecting the interest that it sought to
advance: allowing judges to consider a broad range of information at
sentencing. The sentencing process necessarily involves consideration
of a broad range of factors, but a meaningful solution to the problem
of junk science at sentencing must find a way to screen out unreliable
STS evidence that might unfairly cost a defendant extra years in
prison. It must also do so without infringing on a defendant’s right to
present mitigating evidence.
255 See Thomas, supra note 245. R
256 See id.
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A. The Proposed Procedure
Rules of evidence do not typically apply at sentencing,257 so Rule
702 (or its state equivalents) would need to be adjusted somewhat
before being applied at sentencing. Most relevantly, Rule 702 applies
to evidence offered through a live expert witness (e.g., a DNA analyst,
psychologist, or fingerprint examiner)258 because hearsay is generally
inadmissible at the trial stage.259 Because it is neither feasible nor ad-
visable to require that any STS evidence offered at sentencing be of-
fered through a live witness, the language of the rule proposed herein
has been modified to accommodate evidence offered without a live
witness. The proposed rule, consistent with the asymmetrical ap-
proach described above, is as follows:
Scientific, technical, or other specialized evidence may be ad-
mitted at sentencing by a party other than the defendant
only if:
(a) the evidence will help the sentencer to understand
the evidence, to determine a fact in issue or to render a just
sentence;
(b) the evidence is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the evidence is the product of reliable principles and
methods;
(d) the evidence is the product of reliable application of
the principles and methods to the facts of the case; and
(e) any witness who produced such evidence is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.
This proposal maintains Rule 702’s substantive requirements for
admission of STS evidence, but it tailors these requirements to the
sentencing phase. While it allows for the admission of hearsay forms
of STS evidence, it requires that, regardless of whether the witness
who produced the STS evidence in question testifies at sentencing,
that witness must possess the same expert qualifications (expertise by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education) required by Rule
702.260 It also modifies the relevance standard for the sentencing stage
by allowing admission of the proposed evidence if it aids in under-
257 See sources cited supra note 222. R
258 This is explicit in the language of the rule, which begins, “A witness who is qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
259 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802.
260 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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standing evidence or determining a fact in issue or if it assists in ren-
dering a just sentence.
T.K.’s case can be used to illustrate the ways that a judge should
evaluate STS evidence at sentencing. The first two parts of the pro-
posed rule, parts (a) and (b), are straightforward. They track the lan-
guage of and are substantively identical to parts (a) and (b) of Rule
702. Part (a) of the proposed rule assesses relevance. For the SAVRY
to meet part (a) of the proposed rule, a judge would ask if, taken
together with all of the other information provided, the results of the
SAVRY would aid in his sentencing determination or if they would be
superfluous.261 Part (b) of the proposed rule requires a quantitative
analysis. It asks whether there is enough data to support the conclu-
sion regarding T.K.’s future dangerousness.262
Parts (c) and (d) of the proposed rule are also substantively iden-
tical to Rule 702(c) and (d). They comprise the reliability test codified
in those parts. For the SAVRY to meet part (c) of the proposed rule
above—methodological reliability—several factors might be consid-
ered: Has the SAVRY been validated or tested? On what population?
Does the population on which it was validated mirror the population
it is being used to assess? Are the risk factors the SAVRY purports to
assess based on research and data or on speculation and guesswork?
Has research on the SAVRY been subjected to peer review? What is
the error rate of the tool? Can the error rate of a risk assessment tool
be calculated? How is examiner discretion accounted for? Are the risk
factors the tool treats as predictors of future violence linked to actual
violence? Take, for example, the SAVRY’s treatment of prior convic-
tions as predictors of risk for future violence. Could the SAVRY be
considered reliable if the tool were to treat any prior conviction—
even a conviction for nonviolent conduct—as a predictor of future vi-
olence? These are just a few factors that may be explored to evaluate
whether the SAVRY represents a generally reliable method for pre-
dicting children’s potential for future violence.
To establish prong (d) of the proposed rule—validity as applied—
it must be determined that application of the SAVRY is appropriate in
the specific case even if it is a sound method for assessing future vio-
lence potential generally. Two factors that might be considered in con-
ducting this analysis are (1) whether the tool was misapplied, perhaps
by assigning a higher risk rating than was warranted, and (2) whether
a risk rating was mistakenly assigned to a factor uncorrelated with risk
261 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes.
262 See id.
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of future dangerousness. Analysis of these factors might reveal that
application of the risk assessment instrument was not reliable even if
the tool itself were deemed to be theoretically sound if used
correctly.263
An evaluation of prong (e) might focus on the training, compe-
tence, and experience of the evaluator conducting the assessment.
If courts were required to perform a gatekeeping function and
apply the procedure laid out above at sentencing, it is likely that psy-
chiatric testimony on future dangerousness—like that offered in
Duane Buck’s case—would fail to meet expert admissibility require-
ments under Rule 702.264 In fact, judges and commentators who have
analyzed future dangerousness testimony under the Daubert standard
have argued that, despite its continued use in criminal cases, it would
be found inadmissible due to its lack of reliability.265
B. Analysis of the Proposed Extension of Rule 702
The proposed rule is designed to be an administrable improve-
ment to, not an overhaul of, current sentencing practice. Though abso-
lute uniformity in the way judges apply the standard cannot be
guaranteed, this proposal asks judges and lawyers to apply a standard
they already use regularly at the trial stage. The standard is clearly
defined, laying out each factor to be considered in determining admis-
sibility, and has been in existence for many years, so there is well-
developed case law to guide its application where ambiguities arise.
Its scope is also narrow: it aims to restrict consideration of STS
information of doubtful validity without limiting the sentencer’s abil-
ity to collect and consider non–STS information about a defendant’s
character, criminal history, or other factors that inform punishment.
Still, the proposal’s asymmetrical construction, the potential for
strain on judicial resources in the form of cost, and delay, and the
ineffectiveness of the rule in restricting admissibility of expert evi-
dence at the trial stage may draw criticism. This Section responds to
these potential criticisms.
263 In fact, the evaluator in T.K.’s case did misapply the SAVRY in quite a few of the
described ways. Order, supra note 3, at 8–9. R
264 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially
concurring).
265 See id.; Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 369 (2003).
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1. Asymmetry
Some may hesitate to embrace this proposal because of its asym-
metrical application. On its face, it may seem inequitable given that, at
trial, Rule 702 and its state counterparts apply to all expert evidence,
regardless of the party seeking its admission. Yet several factors ne-
cessitate and justify an asymmetrical approach in dealing with junk
science at sentencing.
As discussed above, junk science has been a major contributor to
wrongful convictions and other miscarriages of justice at the trial
stage.266 This is partly because the government is more likely to pro-
duce flawed scientific information at any stage of a case and indeed,
prosecutors frequently utilize untested STS evidence of questionable
validity.267 On top of that, flawed STS evidence is increasingly being
admitted at sentencings, where it can confuse and unduly influence
sentencers and cause significant problems for defendants, undermin-
ing trust in sentencings.268
The takeaway from all of this is that there has to be some mecha-
nism for screening STS evidence before it may be considered by a
judge or capital jury. But the different stakes and competing interests
of the parties mitigate against a blanket application of Rule 702 and
support applying it only to STS evidence introduced to increase a sen-
tence. J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr note that sentencing frequently
results in harsh punishment and that allowing defendants latitude in
introducing mitigating evidence can lessen that harshness.269 As they
266 See supra Section I.A.
267 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY,
JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:35 (2019). Prosecutors’ resources also contributed to their
use of flawed STS evidence; for the most part, it is the government, not the average criminal
defendant, that has the resources to hire experts and forensic laboratories to analyze evidence.
See Anthony LoMonaco, Note, Disproportionate Impact: An Impetus to Raise the Standard of
Proof at Sentencing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1225, 1252–53 (2017); Laurel Gilbert, Comment, Sharp-
ening the Tools of an Adequate Defense: Providing for the Appointment of Experts for Indigent
Defendants in Child Death Cases Under Ake v. Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469, 487–90
(2013). In criminal cases, most expert evidence is offered by the government. Id. at 490 n.44.
And, forensic science labs work closely with law enforcement and prosecutors, creating an at-
mosphere that encourages pro-prosecution bias and can result in admission of flawed STS evi-
dence. Gilbert, supra, at 487–88.
268 See supra Section I.B.
269 J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely
Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 321–22. Prescott and Starr make this argument in the
context of determinate sentencing systems. Id. at 322. But harsh sentences do not only arise in
determinate systems. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (describing significant in- R
crease in sentence length since the start of the prison population explosion).
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suggest, this is a forceful argument for an asymmetrical approach to
adoption of evidentiary rules at sentencing270 because the criminal le-
gal system, at least theoretically, places a higher premium on protect-
ing liberty than on securing detention.271
The harms caused by STS evidence are radically different based
on why they are used. Unreliable STS evidence offered against a de-
fendant at sentencing may contribute to a significant loss of liberty, or
much worse—it may cost a defendant his life.272 Evidence from a de-
fendant, however, does not harm the government in anything close to
the same way, and it is a valuable part of a system that recognizes the
importance of a defendant’s right to do almost everything he or she
can to defend him or herself. Indeed, the right to present mitigating
evidence in capital and, for juveniles, life without parole cases, is con-
stitutionally required273 and many jurisdictions allow broad presenta-
tion of mitigating evidence by convicted defendants in noncapital
cases as a statutory right, public policy matter, or principle of jus-
tice.274 The need to screen STS evidence at sentencing must therefore
be reconciled with the need to allow defendants to fight for leniency at
a stage where the significant potential for loss of liberty warrants addi-
tional protections.275 The instant proposal does this by structuring a
solution that screens the most problematic STS evidence but recog-
nizes defendants’ interest in presenting mitigating evidence at this
phase.
It is possible that if trial-stage protections that promote reliability
of evidence and protect defendants in light of the power imbalance
between the parties (e.g., the right to have facts proven beyond a rea-
270 Prescott & Starr, supra note 269, at 321–22. R
271 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357 (“[F]or the law holds that it is better
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”); cf., e.g., Tipton v. State, 2013-CA-
00415-SCT (¶ 14) (Miss. 2014) (“We find that a person who serves time in Mississippi’s Intensive
Supervision Program (ISP) is entitled to compensation if wrongly convicted.”).
272 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In a capital
case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist . . . equates with death itself.”).
273 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from con-
sidering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.” (footnote omitted)); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[I]ndividualized sen-
tencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigat-
ing circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty . . . .”).
274 See, e.g., People v. Bush, 238 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); State v. Sullivan, 2018
VT 112, ¶¶ 25–26, 200 A.3d 670.
275 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446, 484 (2000) (recognizing that the potential for
loss of liberty and the need for protections of the defendant are linked).
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sonable doubt and the right to confront) also applied at sentencing,
perhaps an asymmetrical approach would not be necessary under this
proposal. If prosecutors had to do more to persuade a sentencer that a
harsher sentence is necessary in order for it to be imposed and de-
fendants had greater ability to expose unreliable evidence through
confrontation and cross-examination, then Rule 702 might fairly be
applied to both parties at sentencing hearings. Even as sentencing
hearings have evolved to become more complex and the stakes for
defendants have become more serious, extension of constitutional and
evidentiary trial-stage protections has lagged.276 As it stands, then, de-
fendants both need to be protected and need to be afforded great flex-
ibility to seek leniency, making asymmetrical application of the
proposed rule necessary.
This is not a radical departure from how our system currently op-
erates. As mentioned, defendants already enjoy many protections in
the criminal process not extended to prosecutors, witnesses, or others.
In certain capital jurisdictions, versions of this very proposal already
exist: in three states, rules of evidence apply to the presentation of
aggravating evidence, but not mitigating evidence, at capital sentenc-
ing proceedings.277 In effect, these jurisdictions preclude prosecutors
from presenting aggravating evidence, if it is not admissible under the
state’s rules of evidence, but they do not impose the same limitations
on mitigating evidence from the defense, just as the instant proposal
seeks to do with STS evidence. These systems are directly analogous
to the proposal advanced herein. Underlying all of these systems is a
recognition of the importance of a defendant’s substantial interest in
seeking leniency.278
Criminal defendants also enjoy constitutional and evidentiary
protections to ensure the reliability of evidence introduced against
them at trial in non–STS contexts. The right to have facts proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt at trial and the right to confront witnesses
are perhaps the best examples of constitutionalized protections in-
276 See supra Section I.C. But note that the Supreme Court has recognized some limited
constitutional protections at sentencing. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (noting that the right
to trial by jury and the right to have facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt apply to facts that
may increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609
(2002) (holding that aggravating factors must be found by a jury to impose the death penalty
under the Sixth Amendment); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 61, at 53–56 (outlining R
additional constitutional rights that have been recognized to apply at sentencing).
277 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (2020); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2521 (2019).
278 See Kelly, supra note 83, at 438. R
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tended to promote the reliability of evidence offered against defend-
ants.279 Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which governs the
admissibility of character evidence, applies to evidence against de-
fendants but not to government evidence.280 While the prosecutor may
not offer evidence at trial of a defendant’s bad character, the defen-
dant may introduce evidence of a victim’s bad character.281 Another
example is Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which requires the prosecu-
tion to satisfy more criteria when attempting to impeach a defendant
with prior convictions than it requires any party satisfy when making
the same attempt with any other witness.282
Under the federal capital sentencing scheme, aggravating factors
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, while mitigating fac-
tors must only be established by a preponderance of the evidence.283
Likewise, aggravating factors must be found unanimously, while miti-
gating factors need only be found by a single juror.284
The asymmetrical approach advanced herein embraces minimiz-
ing harm to criminal defendants as a goal of sentencing reform and
thus avoids creating tension with capital sentencing law and noncapi-
tal sentencing policy. A more expansive approach—for instance, one
promoting extension of all rules of evidence to sentencing—would
necessarily limit defendants’ ability to introduce mitigating evidence
and might not survive a challenge to its lawfulness under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments in capital sentencing schemes, poten-
tially creating tension with sentencing policy even in the noncapital
sentencing context.285
Finally, the asymmetry of the rule would not pose an undue bur-
den on the government; it will not exclude reliable STS evidence at
sentencing, only unreliable STS evidence. Moreover, Rule 702 and its
state counterparts are rules of admissibility, not weight—the govern-
ment is free to argue that a judge should not rely heavily on STS evi-
dence of questionable validity. It has the resources to make such
challenges and does so with regular success.286
279 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of the Confronta-
tion Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting
it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”).
280 See FED. R. EVID. 404.
281 See id.
282 See FED. R. EVID. 609.
283 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
284 Id. § 3593(d).
285 See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text. R
286 Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Note, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 92
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2. Cost, Delay, and Other Practical Concerns
Extension of Rule 702 or a corresponding state rule to sentencing
may add costs and create delay in those cases in which a defendant
seeks exclusion of STS evidence offered against her. But the potential
for major adverse consequences to defendants where a sentencing de-
cision is based on unreliable STS evidence justifies the additional cost
and delay caused by screening out junk science at sentencing.
Defendants challenge the admissibility of STS evidence proffered
by the government in only a small percentage of trials.287 It is true that
many more defendants are sentenced than go to trial, which might
result in an absolute increase in the number of challenges to STS evi-
dence. But if that number is significant, it only underscores the need
for the reform proposed herein. As STS evidence—and, by extension,
unreliable STS evidence—is becoming more and more common in the
many cases that proceed to sentencing,288 the response cannot be to
leave the status quo in place by admitting all such evidence in order to
avoid burdening the judicial system.
In any event, this proposal is tailored to limit cost and delay be-
cause it does not create a brand-new rule. Adoption of a new rule
might result in greater cost and delay while parties and courts learn
and adapt to the application of a new admissibility standard. Parties
are already familiar with the proposed rule. Prosecutors are equipped
to present information that meets admissibility standards and regu-
larly do so at trial while courts are also experienced in applying and
interpreting the rule.289
As cases are litigated, the contours of what is and is not admissi-
ble will be determined, limiting the need for extended litigation about
the admissibility of different kinds of evidence. It will also raise the
standard for scientific evidence because subjecting STS evidence to
Daubert and Rule 702 will lead to reexamination and renewed scru-
tiny of the underlying science,290 resulting in better STS evidence be-
ing offered in the future.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1557 (2017); FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 267, § 1:35. The same is not true R
of the typical criminal defendant. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 267, § 1:35; Gilbert, supra R
note 267, at 488. R
287 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 267, § 1:35. R
288 See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. R
289 See Deborah Young, Untested Evidence: A Weak Foundation for Sentencing, 5 FED.
SENT’G REP. 63, 65 (1992).
290 See Garrett, supra note 172, at 67; Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Under the Micro- R
scope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (2008).
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3. The Effectiveness of Rule 702 and Daubert at Trial
An important potential critique of the proposal made here is that,
as many commentators have argued, Rule 702 and Daubert have not
been particularly effective in filtering out problematic expert evidence
at the trial phase291 so it might make little sense to try to extend it to
other contexts. In their seminal treatise on scientific evidence, David
Faigman and his coauthors have complained that, with respect to fo-
rensic science evidence, “courts have been, at best, lackadaisical and,
at worst, disingenuous, in carrying out their gatekeeping duties.”292
Moreover, courts are far more lenient in admitting faulty scientific ev-
idence offered by prosecutors than towards such evidence offered by
criminal defendants.293
These concerns have merit. This Article does not seek to inflate
the value of Rule 702 and Daubert and suggest that they perfectly
filter out unsound STS evidence. It suggests only that, at the very
least, the same admissibility standard applied at trial should be
adopted at sentencing. This is because the rule is already in place and
well known, and, as a result, adoption will be straightforward. Imper-
fect though it may be, extension of Rule 702 to sentencing will at least
begin the process of filtering out faulty STS evidence at sentencing.
Importantly, once applied, it can be updated as improvements are
made to strengthen Rule 702 at the trial stage.
Even still, Rule 702 and Daubert have not been total failures.
Since Daubert was issued and Rule 702 was amended to codify its rul-
ing, there has been substantial renewed scrutiny of questionable scien-
tific evidence.294 And when applied properly, the Rule is quite
effective in exposing the unreliability of faulty STS evidence.295
291 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 44, at 84–86; Koehler, supra note 45, at 1389, 1395. See R
generally Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 45 (discussing how the Daubert/Rule 702 reliability R
test has done little to keep out unreliable evidence); Giannelli, supra note 45 (same). R
292 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 267, § 1:30. R
293 See id.; Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 45, at 1561–62; Damon-Moore, supra note 286, R
at 1557.
294 See Bernstein, supra note 193, at 69; Garrett, supra note 172, at 67. See generally NAS R
REPORT, supra note 45 (reporting the results of a congressionally mandated study on, and mak- R
ing recommendations to improve, forensic science).
295 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 172, at 71–78 (describing the North Carolina Court of R
Appeals’ analysis of fingerprint evidence under Rule 702(d) in State v. McPhaul, 808 S.E.2d 294,
303 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017), disc. review allowed by 812 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 2018), and disc. review
improvidently allowed, 818 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 2018)).
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III. OTHER PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE SENTENCING ACCURACY
Many scholars have noted the importance of the sentencing phase
in today’s criminal legal system,296 share this author’s concerns over
the accuracy of criminal sentences,297 and have called for the applica-
tion of trial-stage rights and procedures to sentencing or for other sen-
tencing reforms.298 This Section reviews a reflective sampling of such
proposals and their suitability for addressing the effect junk science
has on sentencings. It concludes that, though valuable in their own
right, none of the proposals adequately addresses the precise problem
considered in this Article: how to minimize the contribution of STS
evidence of questionable soundness to unjust sentences without creat-
ing added harms for criminal defendants.
A. Proposals to Extend Rules of Evidence to Sentencing
A common suggestion for reforming sentencing hearings is to ex-
tend either all, some, or a specialized version of the rules of evidence
to sentencing hearings. This Section contains an analysis of two such
proposals.
Almost thirty years ago, Third Circuit Judge Edward Becker and
Aviva Orenstein noted that the adoption of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) in 1987299 increased the impor-
tance of the sentencing phase in federal criminal cases.300 They ex-
plained that adoption of the then-mandatory301 Sentencing Guidelines
296 See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 62, at 793 (“Now more than ever, factual findings made R
during felony sentencing hearings are as quantitatively vital as those that were previously only
made during trials.”); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 61, at 56 (“Sentencing is a critically impor- R
tant phase of the criminal justice system for determining the punishment a defendant will re-
ceive, and it continues to grow in importance because most criminal defendants plead guilty
rather than proceed to trial.”).
297 See, e.g., Young, supra note 79, at 302–03. R
298 See Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 499, 539–40 (2014)
(collecting sources written by scholars that propose a range of sentencing reforms); Young, supra
note 289, at 63, 65 (same). R
299 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
300 See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
857, 887–91 (1992). Though Becker and Orenstein’s discussion of the impact of the Sentencing
Guidelines on federal sentencing occurred when the Sentencing Guidelines were considered
mandatory, their argument has continued force today. The Sentencing Guidelines continue to be
highly influential. See LoMonaco, supra note 267, at 1246–49. This is because, inter alia, sentenc- R
ing judges are required to consider the Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and because
they continue to treat the Sentencing Guidelines as a benchmark for sentencing decisions. See
LoMonaco, supra note 267, at 1247–48. R
301 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were considered mandatory until the Supreme
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resulted in sending a greater percentage of convicted defendants to
prison and longer sentences for certain crimes,302 largely because
sentences depended on factual findings made at sentencing hearings,
including about the commission of uncharged offenses.303 Almost
thirty years ago, Judge Becker and Orenstein saw the problem clearly:
reliance upon evidence inadmissible at the trial stage at sentencing
increases sentences in ways that are not justified.304 They called sen-
tencing hearings “arguably the most important judicial business con-
ducted by Article III judges”305 and explained that “the de facto
liberty interest is tried at the sentencing hearing, not the trial, and yet
the evidentiary standards required in trials are absent.”306
Consequently, Judge Becker and Orenstein argued for the appli-
cation of specialized rules of evidence written specifically for sentenc-
ing.307 They posited that the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
in deciding that the Rules would not apply at sentencing, did not an-
ticipate the massive changes to sentences that adoption of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines created.308 Judge Becker and Orenstein thus
argued for the extension of selected rules of evidence to sentencing.309
Alternatively, they recommended that courts apply a “strong reliabil-
ity standard” to evidence that might have a “significant impact” on a
sentence.310
Others have also suggested extending existing evidentiary rules to
sentencing hearings. Deborah Young, for instance, argued that the
Federal Rules of Evidence should apply at federal sentencing to mini-
mize inaccurate sentences and to prevent defendants from being in-
jured by such sentences.311 She notes that there are two “key harms”
that courts should avoid at sentencing: inaccurate factfinding and al-
lowing defendants to suffer the consequences of sentencing errors.312
Court struck down their mandatory provisions in 2005. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
226–27 (2005).
302 Becker & Orenstein, supra note 300, at 889–90. R
303 For a basic overview of how guidelines calculations are performed, see LoMonaco,
supra note 267, at 1232–34. R
304 Becker & Orenstein, supra note 300, at 887–90. R
305 Id. at 889.




310 Id. at 891. Becker and Orenstein suggested that this standard might be equated to a
clear and convincing standard. Id.
311 Young, supra note 79, at 302–04. R
312 Id. at 302.
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She suggests that adoption of rules of evidence at sentencing would be
both a practically feasible, efficient, and comprehensive means of im-
proving sentencing and a way to minimize the possibility that sentenc-
ing errors harm defendants.313 She emphasizes the comprehensive
nature of the broad extension of rules of evidence as a beneficial con-
trast to taking a “piecemeal” approach to solving specific sentencing
problems.314
B. Other Proposals to Improve Sentencing Accuracy
Other critics have focused less on rules of evidence than on a
variety of other reforms to the sentencing phase. Carissa Byrne Hes-
sick and F. Andrew Hessick argue that traditional justifications for
denying defendants procedural rights at sentencing are unfounded
and unpersuasive315 and that each procedural right should be ex-
amined individually to determine whether it should be enforced at
sentencing.316
They examine the rights that apply at sentencing in two types of
sentencing systems: mandatory systems, in which a particular sentence
is indicated based on specific facts, such as mandatory guidelines sys-
tems and capital sentencing systems; and discretionary systems, in
which punishment is decided largely by a judge with broad discre-
tion.317 Hessick and Hessick note that courts have enforced a number
of procedural rights in mandatory schemes—including the right to
have facts that increase a sentence found by a jury, the right to have
such facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to notice of
factors that may increase a sentence, and the right not to be sentenced
under retroactive laws—but that these protections have not been held
to apply in discretionary systems.318
They discuss three rationales that traditionally have been offered
to justify greater procedural protections in mandatory sentencing
schemes than in discretionary sentencing schemes: (1) the idea that
judicial discretion negates the need for procedural protections at sen-
tencing; (2) the notion that defendants have an expectation that they
will not receive a sentencing increase without a finding of aggravating
circumstances in mandatory systems; and (3) a “history-based” ratio-
313 Id. at 302–03.
314 Id. at 303.
315 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 239, at 187, 189–90. R
316 Id. at 234.
317 Id. at 188. Hessick and Hessick are careful to clarify, however, that no sentencing sys-
tem is entirely mandatory or entirely discretionary. Id.
318 Id.
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nale that aggravating facts are not merely sentencing factors, but ele-
ments of a crime requiring greater procedural protection.319
After an in-depth analysis of each rationale, Hessick and Hessick
conclude that incongruent application of procedural rights in
mandatory but not discretionary schemes is not justified.320 Specifi-
cally, they note that the argument that procedures will interfere with
judges’ abilities to collect information about a defendant and use their
discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence, much like the rationale
of the Williams holding,321 is too broad because it fails to account for
the role of procedural rights in improving the accuracy of information
relied upon by the sentencing judge.322 They note, too, that both dis-
cretionary and mandatory systems require factfinding at sentencing,
and thus accuracy of information is just as important in the former as
it is in the latter.323 With regard to the second two rationales, they
argue that defendants have strong expectations even in discretionary
systems, and the historical aggravators-as-elements rationale is based
on a faulty understanding of historical practice.324
Ultimately, Hessick and Hessick conclude that enforcing proce-
dural rights based on the type of sentencing scheme is not defensi-
ble.325 They argue that resolving the question of what rights must be
enforced at sentencing should depend on the purpose of the proce-
dure, rather than the type of system to which it is being applied.326
Because different rights serve different purposes, they argue, each
should be analyzed individually to determine whether it should apply
at sentencing.327
Brandon Garrett takes a back-end approach to improving sen-
tencing accuracy, focusing on the remedies available to correct a sen-
tencing error after the fact. He notes that sentencing errors can occur
in myriad ways but that not all types of sentencing errors can be reme-
died under the same standard, or at all.328 He argues that a single,
consistent miscarriage of justice standard that “asks whether a reason-
able judge would ‘more likely than not’” have sentenced a defendant
319 Id. at 189–90, 221–33.
320 Id. at 234.
321 See supra Section I.C.2.
322 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 239, at 222. R
323 See id. at 223.
324 Id. at 227–33.
325 Id. at 233.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 233–34.
328 Garrett, supra note 298, at 500–03. R
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differently but for an error at sentencing should apply to review of all
sentencing errors, regardless of the type of error or procedural context
in which it is raised.329
Others have proposed various wide-ranging reforms to improve
sentencing accuracy and reliability.330 Some have argued that to im-
prove the reliability of sentencing decisions, the standard of proof at
sentencing should be raised331 or that confrontation rights should be
recognized.332 Shaakirrah Sanders recognizes that in the modern sys-
tem of mass plea bargaining, facts pertinent to the sentencing decision
are commonly established after the plea at sentencing,333 similar to
trials, yet they do not ensure a defendant’s right to confront evidence
against him and thus create a risk that the defendant will be sentenced
based on unreliable evidence.334 Sanders concludes that where testi-
monial statements are material to punishment and where cross-exami-
nation will be useful in determining the veracity of such statements,
confrontation rights should extend to felony sentencing.335
C. The Suitability of These Proposals
Each of the proposals discussed above is likely to lead to some
degree of increased accuracy and reliability in sentencing. But because
their focus is different than that of the instant proposal, none quite
adequately addresses the precise problem of how to minimize unjust
329 Id. at 504. Garrett also acknowledges that a number of potential front-end sentencing
reforms may be useful in reducing sentencing errors in the first instance. Id. at 539–42. He sug-
gests that these reforms may include use of properly validated risk assessments and application
of the Daubert standard to sentencing. Id.
330 The listed examples encompass a subset of proposals made to improve accuracy and
reliability of sentencing decisions; they are meant to provide a survey of recommendations
rather than a comprehensive listing of all such recommendations made to date. Others include,
for example: Prescott & Starr, supra note 269, at 355 (suggesting, inter alia, bifurcation, applica- R
tion of certain rules of evidence, and a number of proposals aimed at improving the factfinding
abilities of juries); Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Con-
stitutional Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence,” 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 159–61
(1993) (suggesting that procedural protections for defendants at sentencing should not be less
than those afforded parties in civil suits).
331 See, e.g., LoMonaco, supra note 267; Stephanie C. Slatkin, Note, The Standard of Proof R
at Sentencing Hearings Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Why the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard Is Constitutionally Inadequate, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 583; see also Becker &
Orenstein, supra note 300, at 891. R
332 See generally Sanders, supra note 84, at 108 (“This Article advocates reexamining the R
theory that confrontation rights only apply at trial.”).
333 Id. at 127–28.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 168–69.
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sentences based on junk science without hindering a defendant’s abil-
ity to present mitigating evidence.
Becker and Orenstein’s proposals are designed to address a
broad concern about sentencing accuracy. As a result, neither is well
tailored to manage the specific issue of reliance on unsound scientific
evidence at sentencing. Their proposed extension of certain or special-
ized rules of evidence to sentencings does not include a discussion of
extending Rule 702 to sentencing nor does it home in on how to deal
with STS evidence at sentencing. Becker and Orenstein’s alternative
proposal—to apply a heightened reliability standard to evidence that
might significantly impact a sentence—might lead to disparate punish-
ment decisions for similarly situated defendants, in part because the
recommended standard is not precisely defined. Judges across, and
even within, jurisdictions may hold differing views on what evidence
might have a “significant impact” on a sentence. As a result, the same
type of evidence may be treated as requiring a heightened reliability
standard in some cases and not in others. An advantage of the recom-
mendation made herein, in contrast, is that the rule is already well-
defined, and there is significant attendant case law to guide its applica-
tion. Moreover, Becker and Orenstein’s proposal pre-dated Daubert,
so they cannot be faulted for not explaining how their “strong” relia-
bility standard would correspond to the current version of Rule 702,
its state analogs, or Daubert. Nevertheless, their proposal is silent on
how a “strong reliability standard” would treat STS evidence of ques-
tionable validity.
Garrett’s proposal to create a clear and consistent remedy for all
sentencing errors could improve overall sentencing accuracy. But it is
a back-end solution that focuses on remedying sentencing errors after
the fact; it is not designed to prevent them from occurring in the first
place and is certainly not specifically tailored to prevent errors arising
from reliance on problematic STS evidence. Under Garrett’s propo-
sal, as with any appellate remedy, not all defendants would avail
themselves of the proposed remedy and even among those who
would, not all would prevail. In any event, many—if not most—of
those who would seek to avail themselves of the remedy would have
to wait in prison until their case was resolved. Ultimately, Garrett’s
proposal—as he himself recognizes by suggesting additional re-
forms336—does not obviate the need for a front-end approach to im-
proving sentencing accuracy. His focus is on the wider problem of
336 See Garrett, supra note 298, at 539–42. R
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sentencing error generally, not the narrow problem of errors resulting
from improper reliance on unreliable scientific evidence addressed
here.
At least since Williams, sentencing policy has prioritized the need
to consider a wide range of information about a defendant’s character
and background.337 Despite its analytical flaws, Williams continues to
be cited with approval.338 This is one possible reason proposals like
those described above have not been implemented. Adoption of rules
of evidence at sentencing would also limit a judge’s ability to rely on a
wide range of other evidence, like character letters and victim impact
statements containing hearsay. Extension of rules of evidence to sen-
tencing, therefore, would result in direct tension with the sentencing
goals set out in Williams.
The fundamental tenet of Williams, that judges must be able to
collect and consider a broad range of information about a defendant
in order to fashion an appropriate sentence,339 is not entirely without
merit. The problem with Williams is primarily that the holding goes
too far by failing to consider that, in order to avoid sentencing errors
or unjustly harsh sentences, information must also be accurate.340 Pro-
posals that seek to apply too many trial level evidentiary protections
to sentencings are overbroad and would filter out too much informa-
tion, which is what the Williams holding reasonably sought to prevent.
For example, wholesale application of the rules of evidence might help
prevent judges from relying on hearsay evidence contained in pseudo-
scientific reports or on unfounded rumors, but it would also prevent
them from considering evidence that is widely acknowledged to be
appropriate for consideration at a sentencing hearing. If Federal Rule
of Evidence 404, which restricts the introduction at trials of character
evidence or evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts to
demonstrate criminal propensity,341 were held to apply at sentencing, a
judge would be precluded from hearing character and character his-
tory that is considered routinely to justify an increase or decrease in
sentence length.342 Thus, broad extension of rules of evidence at sen-
tencing may deprive sentencers of information that has limited rele-
337 See supra Section I.C.
338 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. R
339 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. R
340 See supra notes 237, 239 and accompanying text. R
341 See FED. R. EVID. 404.
342 In fact, character and criminal history are factors that the sentencer is usually en-
couraged to consider. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 2018).
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vance at trial but that has been recognized as important to punishment
decisions.
While the proponents of the recommendations above frequently
frame their suggestions as ways to improve sentencing accuracy, inher-
ent in those proposals is a recognition that a goal of sentencing reform
is to minimize the harm to criminal defendants at sentencing.343 Still,
many of the proposals would hurt defendants as they purport to make
the hearings fairer, restricting defendants’ ability to rely on character
letters or other hearsay evidence at sentencing.344 In effect, such pro-
posals would create the precise scenario this Article seeks to avoid:
sentencing whack-a-mole, remedying one harm while allowing a new
one to surface. On the other hand, by focusing on a very specific cause
of unfair sentences—unreliable STS evidence—the proposed rule ex-
tension made in this Article sidesteps the overbreadth problem suf-
fered by other recommendations.
Some of the proposals discussed above seek to balance the need
for sentencing accuracy with the desire to minimize harm to defend-
ants. These proposals focus on recognizing rights traditionally enjoyed
by criminal defendants only at trial during the sentencing phase as
well. For instance, increasing the burden of proof or recognizing con-
frontation rights at sentencing would increase the reliability of infor-
mation considered at sentencing without placing a new burden on
defendants.
Yet, these proposals are limited in their ability to minimize the
role of faulty STS evidence in contributing to unjust sentencing out-
comes. Raising the standard of proof by which the government must
establish sentencing facts would certainly increase the quality of evi-
dence relied upon at sentencing in many cases.345 But, just as with
Becker and Orenstein’s proposal for a “strong reliability standard,”
courts might not apply the standard in the same way.346 Perhaps more
importantly, it does not actually screen out unreliable evidence. At
343 See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 300, at 888–89; Sanders, supra note 84, at 168. R
Other proponents acknowledge this goal more explicitly. Garrett, supra, note 298, at 543 (“Sen- R
tencing errors are inevitable, and although claims of sentencing error can raise complex issues,
the practical importance of addressing their merits is simple: convicts should not serve added
time based on errors.”); Young, supra note 79, at 302 (“Two key harms to be avoided in fact- R
finding at guidelines sentencing are inaccuracy in fact-finding and having defendants unfairly
bear the burden of errors in fact-finding.”).
344 Of course, the same would be true with respect to prosecutors’ reliance on victim im-
pact statements or presentence investigation reports.
345 See Young, supra note 79, at 358–59. R
346 See id. at 355–56 (providing examples of how one standard of proof may be applied in
multiple ways).
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trial, even with an elevated burden of proof, Rule 702 requires that
judges perform their gatekeeping function and prevent the admission
of unreliable scientific evidence at the outset, lest a factfinder over-
rely on evidence labeled as “scientific.”347 Such evidence needs to be
screened before admission. The same is true at sentencing; increasing
the burden of proof would be an important step towards improving
sentencing outcomes, but it would not serve as a substitute for a mech-
anism to screen out unreliable or invalid STS evidence.
The same applies for the right to confront witnesses. Recognizing
the right to confront at sentencing would certainly aid in improving
the reliability and veracity of evidence considered at sentencing348 but,
just as confrontation does not obviate the need for application of the
substantive admissibility test laid out in Rule 702 and its state counter-
parts at trial, it also would not at sentencing. Indeed, Daubert’s hold-
ing, requiring trial courts to conduct a gatekeeping function to ensure
the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence despite the availa-
bility of cross-examination, rejects this idea.349
The proposal advanced in this Article is narrowly tailored to ad-
dress one very specific, but common, cause of unfair sentences—reli-
ance on unreliable STS evidence—and it does so while both allowing
judges to consider relevant and reliable evidence that might not be
admissible at trial and protecting defendants’ rights to present mitigat-
ing evidence.
CONCLUSION
Admissibility thresholds apply at trial to keep “junk science”
from resulting in wrongful convictions and other miscarriages of jus-
tice. At sentencing, where the liberty interest may be greater than at
trial, the same should apply. Still, there has been insufficient discus-
sion of the extent to which STS evidence has contributed to unjust
outcomes at sentencing.
347 See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text. R
348 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“The [Confrontation] Clause thus
reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence . . . , but about how
reliability can best be determined.”).
349 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[T]he trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but relia-
ble.” (emphasis added)); see also PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, Rule 702: Testimony by Expert Witnesses,
in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2020) (explaining that Daubert rejects sole reliance on
the adversary system for ensuring relevance and reliability of expert evidence); United States v.
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Our adversarial system has
much to commend it, but it is not a general substitute for the specific Daubert inquiry.”).
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It is in no one’s interest—not the defendant’s, not society’s, not
even the prosecutor’s350—for sentences to be based upon unreliable
evidence. The criminal justice system prioritizes protecting liberty
above securing detention.351 The solution proposed by this Article
targets the problematic reliance on STS evidence of questionable va-
lidity while acknowledging and promoting this principle.
***
Ultimately, T.K.’s story had a relatively happy ending that illus-
trates how the proposal made herein is administrable and can be ef-
fective in screening out junk science at sentencing. T.K.’s judge did
not have to grant a hearing on the reliability of the SAVRY results or
assess the admissibility of those results under Daubert. But he decided
to anyway, holding a hearing at which he heard evidence from an ex-
pert on the SAVRY’s lack of reliability and the problematic applica-
tion of the tool in T.K.’s case.352 That decision was pivotal. The peek
behind the curtain showed T.K.’s judge that, despite the aura of trust-
worthiness STS evidence carries with it, not all such evidence is relia-
ble. He found that the risk evaluator’s conclusion was not supported
by her data, and he decided not to rely on the assessment at
sentencing.353
T.K.’s challenge was successful because the stars aligned for him
in a way that is not likely to happen again; he is one of very few crimi-
nal defendants to have been represented by well-resourced defenders
who were willing to litigate his claim despite knowing the law would
not support it. On top of that, he was fortunate to have been assigned
a judge who was willing to analyze whether the purportedly scientific
evidence he was presented with was actually reliable. But T.K.’s case
does not have to be a one-off. As described above, some commenters
may argue against the proposal advanced here by noting that Rule 702
has proven ineffective in screening out unreliable STS evidence at the
trial stage. But tell that to T.K.: T.K.’s judge essentially applied the
350 See, e.g., DaCosta v. City of New York, 296 F. Supp. 3d 569, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), (“It is
uncontroversial that a lawyer representing the government in the criminal context has a height-
ened ethical obligation that extends beyond just representing the narrow interests of her most
direct client; she also must endeavor to ‘do justice.’”).
351 See, e.g., Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Presumption of Civil Innocence, 104 VA. L.
REV. 589, 589 (2018) (“The presumption of innocence represents a political and moral consensus
that criminal defendants should not be subject to punishment until adjudicated guilty under a
strict standard of proof.”).
352 See Order, supra note 3, at 4. R
353 See id. at 8–9.
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model advanced here; and, in doing so, changed T.K.’s future. Though
T.K.’s case is only a single data point, it demonstrates that the propo-
sal advanced here is administrable and, if adopted, can result in fewer
miscarriages of justice.
If not for the judge’s highly unusual decision to review the relia-
bility of the report submitted against T.K., junk science would have
cost T.K. his liberty and, likely, his prospects for a successful future.
Few, if any, defendants are afforded the opportunity that T.K. was
and are, therefore, at the mercy of unreliable STS evidence at sentenc-
ing. This Article has advanced one proposal for changing that.
